Syracuse University

SURFACE
Dissertations - ALL

SURFACE

May 2018

Essays on Retirement Behavior during the Housing Boom and
Bust
Wancong Fu
Syracuse University

Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/etd
Part of the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

Recommended Citation
Fu, Wancong, "Essays on Retirement Behavior during the Housing Boom and Bust" (2018). Dissertations ALL. 846.
https://surface.syr.edu/etd/846

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the SURFACE at SURFACE. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Dissertations - ALL by an authorized administrator of SURFACE. For more information, please contact
surface@syr.edu.

Abstract
This study contains two chapters. The first uses the Prentice-Gloeckler-Meyer
proportional hazard model with individual heterogeneity to investigate the effects of loss
aversion concerning the housing market and the local foreclosure rate on retirement during the
housing bust periods. The second chapter creates a dynamic programming life-cycle model with
the housing wealth and uses the Method of Simulated Moments to systematically study the
retirement and saving behavior during the housing boom and bust (the years 2000-2014).
Housing wealth is one of the biggest savings for elderly. It relates to the financial security
of elderly after retirement. After the incredible growth of housing prices in the early 2000s, the
housing market melted down at the end of the year 2007. A tremendous decline in property value
caused a high uncertainty about the housing market. Even though elderly were not sure how
severe the housing bust would be, they knew the highest value of home equity before the Great
Recession. In the first chapter, we use this highest value at the year 2006 to measure the loss
aversion concerning housing wealth. Higher housing equity at the year 2006 might experience
more loss in the Great Recession. When there was a loss of housing wealth, it increased the
uncertainty of financial resources in the future. Delaying retirement and working more years to
increase savings are a reasonable plan to improve resources.
For the same amount of housing wealth loss, the effect is not the same if elderly live in a
different area and a different housing market. The expectation of housing market performance is
also not the same. We have high-quality data on local foreclosure rates from Equifax. It provides
the number of foreclosures starting in the first week of July from year 2005 to 2012 on the zipcode level. We use the local foreclosure rate to approximate the expectation of the local housing
market. Coefficients of both home equity at the year 2006 and local foreclosure rate (except the

year 2009) are significant and negative, meaning elderly with higher home equity at the year
2006 and elderly who live in an area with a higher foreclosure rate significantly delay their
retirement.
In the second chapter, we create a dynamic programming life-cycle model based on
French and Jones (2011). We still take into account the risks of wage, health status, mortality and
medical cost in our models. Because we study the elderly after the year 2000, the ‘Senior
Citizens’ Freedom to Work Act of 2000’ that eliminates the Social Security earnings test after
normal retirement age is applied. We use the re-entry state variable to control the labor force
participation when there is no Social Security earnings test.
New models separate the housing wealth from total wealth in the original model and
consider the housing wealth through two constraints: the baseline model has an unknown
proportional housing wealth in the asset accumulation equation; the modified model has a home
equity borrowing constraint. New models also take into account housing wealth change in the
bequest motive component.
Both the baseline and modified models match the labor-force participation well and
capture the high exit rate at the Medicare age. The coefficient of unknown proportional housing
wealth in the baseline model indicates that elderly takes into account approximately 25 percent
of their housing wealth in the asset accumulation, which, coincidently, is close to the average
ratio of loan to value in the data. The modified model matches better than the baseline model in
the asset quantile moments (saving behavior). Robust checks show the bequest coefficients
significantly change if we do not separate housing wealth from total wealth. Surprisingly, change
of bequest curvature is close to the mean of the housing wealth.

Three experiments are conducted in the second chapter. We experiment with two
different housing wealth projections and one tighter borrowing constraint. The results indicate
that loss of housing wealth and tight borrowing constraints delay retirement. Even though we use
the long-term growth rate and obtain a similar mean of labor-force participation rate, the curves
significantly shift to adjust the new expectation of housing wealth change.

Essays on Retirement Behavior during the Housing Boom and Bust

by
Wancong Fu

B.S., North China Electricity Power University, 2012

Dissertation
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics.

Syracuse University
May 2018

Copyright © Wancong Fu 2018
All Rights Reserved

Acknowledgments
The work presented in this dissertation was recommended and encouraged by my
advisor, Dr. Jan Ondrich. This thesis would not be completed without his endless help and
guidance. I am extremely grateful for his support and advising throughout the entire course of
my dissertation. Whenever I encountered troubles in research, he was always available to discuss
the ideas and provide direction to ensure the accuracy of the work.
I would like to thank Professor John Yinger for his incredible teaching on the modeling
in Urban Economics. I learned a great deal from his class about the U.S. housing market,
including the Hedonic model and Housing Price Index. This knowledge helps me carefully
include the housing market in the dissertation.
I would also like to thank Professor Alfonso Flores-Lagune. His causal inference in
Labor Economics taught me how to deeply think about the mechanisms behind the economic
phenomenon, which helped me to frame the second chapter and improves its interpretation.
I am also grateful to Professor William Horrace, Professor Hugo Jales and Professor
David Popp for serving on my dissertation committee. Professor William Horrace is the first true
scholar I met here in the first summer of my Ph.D. study career. He introduced me to the
advanced probability theory and Econometrics to me, which intrigued me to become an
econometrician in the future. Professor Hugo Jales gave me tremendous help and incredible
advice in both job market and dissertation.
I am indebted to Professor Stuart Rosenthal, Badi Baltagi, Chihwa Kao and Jeffrey
Kubik. Their guidance in advanced economic theory in Urban Economics, Labor Economics,

vi

and Econometrics enlightened me to understand the greatness of Economics and Econometrics.
Each of them remind me of what a true scholar is.
I enjoyed every moment in the Center for Policy Research. It provided me incredible
access to the high-quality dataset and several series of exciting seminars. Particularly, I want to
thank Candi Patterson for her help on computer technological issues. Without her help, it would
have been impossible to finish my second chapter.
Last but not the least, I dedicate this dissertation to my parents, Guanglie Fu and Qiuyan
Zhu, and my little sister, Yuxiao Fu. My little sister always brought me happiness when I was in
bad mood. Without their continuous encouragement and sponsorship, I would not have
completed the first great achievement in my life.

vii

Contents
Chapter 1 ..................................................................................................................................................... 1
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 1
Literature Review ....................................................................................................................................... 3
Hazard Estimation ...................................................................................................................................... 9
The Data..................................................................................................................................................... 13
Results ........................................................................................................................................................ 18
Summary.................................................................................................................................................... 35
Chapter 2 ................................................................................................................................................... 40
Outline........................................................................................................................................................ 40
Literature Review ..................................................................................................................................... 44
Forward-Looking Structural Model ....................................................................................................... 48
Data and Life-Cycle Profile...................................................................................................................... 53
HRS Data ............................................................................................................................................... 53
Wages ..................................................................................................................................................... 55
Medical Costs and Insurance Types .................................................................................................... 57
Housing .................................................................................................................................................. 60
Social Security Benefits and AIME ..................................................................................................... 60
Pension Benefits .................................................................................................................................... 61
Spousal Income...................................................................................................................................... 62
Health Transition and Mortality ......................................................................................................... 62
Types of Heterogeneity ......................................................................................................................... 64
Re-Entry Status ..................................................................................................................................... 64
Moment Conditions and Numerical Methods ........................................................................................ 64
Estimation Results and Model Fitness .................................................................................................... 70
Robustness Check ..................................................................................................................................... 77
Counterfactual Experiments .................................................................................................................... 88
Discussion and Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 97
Reference ................................................................................................................................................... 98

viii

1

Chapter 1
Introduction
Assessing how earnings, employer-provided pensions, and individual assets
contribute to retirement income and wealth accumulation requires an understanding of how
these sources of retirement income affect the retirement decisions of older work ers.1
Economists use duration analysis to estimate the effect of the socio-economic characteristics
on the conditional probability of retirement (see, for example, Diamond and Hausman 1984;
Gustman and Steinmeier 1986 and 2000; and Hurd 1990). However, an accurate assessment
also requires an understanding of how the levels and future expectations of the different
sources of retirement income have changed in the last several years.
The U.S. economy has experienced two major recessions in the last two decades. The
first of these started in late 2000 following the Tech Bust. Firms laid off millions of employees
as profits fell. While employment outcomes for older workers in fact remained favorable during
the recession and recovery (see Munnell, Sass, Soto and Zhivan 2006; and Cooper 2008), the
recession brought substantial declines in the value of their defined contribution plans and other
non-housing equity assets. The S&P 500 index fell in 2003 to a value last seen in 1997. It had
passed the 1500 benchmark in the year 2000 but next attained that level only in 2007. The
declines in retirement assets led to delays in the decision to retire (see Cooper 2008).
Unlike the Tech Bust, the Housing Bust of 2007 brought with it not only a decline in
financial asset values but also a decline in property values unprecedented in recent decades. By
April 2008 equities were off 15.5 percent from their October 2007 highs, while housing prices
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Retirement can mean Social Security claiming age, self-reported retirement, or full or partial retirement (see Gustman and
Steinmeier 2002). The econometric analysis below will be performed for a self-reported retirement definition.
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were down by 10 percent or more nationally from the preceding year. By 2009 the Housing Bust
had not only caused a decline in home values of 28 percent in the United States (see Reinhart and
Rogoff 2009), it had also increased the uncertainty about the current and future values of a
particular home. In a March 18, 2013 interview with the Daily Ticker, Robert Shiller of Yale
University says “the future of the housing market is a great unknown.” (See also Nakamura
2010.) Case, Shiller, and Thompson (2012) find that respondents in their survey seem to have a
much unclear picture when the housing market is ambiguous. Short-run expectations are
underreacted to the year-to-year changes in actual home prices. Older workers consider their
home to be both a place to live in retirement and a store of wealth for bequests or in case of
emergency. Anecdotal evidence (see, for example Levitz 2008) suggests that the general declines
in home values that started in 2007 and the uncertainty about the value of housing delays the
retirement of these workers. Older workers will want to work longer to accumulate additional
wealth to replace lost housing value.
We use both the Prentice-Gloeckler or complementary log-log proportional hazard model
(see Prentice and Gloeckler 1978) and the heterogeneity-corrected Prentice-Gloeckler-Meyer
proportional hazard model (see Meyer 1990) to estimate the determinants of the time to first selfreported retirement of married males.2 Restricting the sample to married males reduces
heterogeneity due to including single males who are not involved in joint decision-making. By
including a dummy indicating the retirement status of the female spouse in the covariate list of
the male spouse, the estimated model takes into account coincidence in tastes for leisure, since

2

The focus on first retirement excludes subsequent retirement after a re-entry into the labor force, the timing of which may have
different determinants.
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each spouse’s utility depends on the retirement status of the other (see Gustman and Steinmeier
2000; and Hurd 1990).
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) waves from 1992 through 2012 provide the
data for the estimation. Demographic data and data on income, pensions, and housing and nonhousing financial wealth form the basis of the covariate list. We use the restricted Social Security
Administration data to obtain the zip code of the household’s primary residence, which is then tied to
the percentage of foreclosures started in the month of July for years after the Housing Bust, obtained
from Equifax Credit Trends 4.0,. This local percentage of foreclosures is included as a hazard
covariate.
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 constitutes the literature
review, while section 3 presents the econometric theory. Section 4 describes the data in greater
detail. Section 5 presents the empirical results and section 6 concludes.

Literature Review
Work by Diamond and Hausman (1984) is among the first important studies to examine
the determinants of the retirement behavior of older men. They suggest that individual
uncertainty concerning wealth accumulation, financial needs, health and job opportunities should
be a central focus in using longitudinal data for this purpose. The statistical specification used by
Diamond and Hausman is a Weibull duration model with a Gamma random effect, introduced
into the economic literature by Lancaster 1979, to control for unobserved determinants of
retirement.
There are distinct advantages to using a duration model instead of other statistical
methods to study retirement. First, in most longitudinal data there will be a degree of censoring
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(the respondent will not have retired by the end of the sample period), which can easily be
incorporated into the likelihood function for duration. Second, the fact that relevant regressors
are likely to change over time can be handled in a straightforward manner in a hazard analysis.
Diamond and Hausman find that both private pensions and Social Security have strong
positive effects on the retirement hazard of older men. The Social Security effect is strong when
benefits first become available at age 62 and rises for workers over 62. Bad health has a
significantly positive effect on the retirement hazard at all ages, no matter what financial
incentives or disincentives are provided by private pensions and Social Security. They find little
effect for variables related to education and marital status. At least in part, this may be due to the
way these variables were specified. The highest degree attained was not controlled for directly;
nor was the work status of a spouse. In the latter case, a spouse who works may provide
additional financial security, at least until her retirement. Conversely, a spouse who has never
worked or has previously retired (or is about to retire) may enhance the utility of retirement,
since the additional leisure can be shared with a partner with similar interests. This reasoning
clearly suggests a need to consider the joint retirement decision of the husband and the wife.
Perhaps the first important work concerning the joint retirement decision of married
couples is by Hurd (1990). Hurd seeks to determine whether husbands and wives tend to retire
the same time, and if so to provide an explanation for this tendency. He finds evidence of the coordination of retirement dates, both through preliminary analysis of the data as well as economic
modeling. Hurd hypothesizes that the closeness of retirement dates could be due to either
similarity of tastes caused by assortative mating, by economic variables, or by complementarity
of leisure. He claims that each potential explanation has different implications for the response of
retirement to policy changes. According to his empirical results, economic variables appear to
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explain very little of the closeness of retirement dates. He also rules out assortative mating as a
potential explanation. The only hypothesis left is the complementarity of leisure. Unfortunately,
Hurd feels that data limitations leave him with only a qualitative result. Hurd’s methodology
does not involve duration modeling.
Over the last 25 years two sets of researchers, working independently, have made
significant contributions to the theory and empirical analysis of retirement behavior.
Gustman and Steinmeier focus on structural modeling and have relied primarily on the
HRS for their data. Gustman and Steinmeier (1986) estimate a structural model of retirement
choice that interacts lifetime preferences and incentives. Their results track actual retirement
behavior closely, including peaks in the retirement rate at ages 62 and 65.
Gustman and Steinmeier (2000) develop a structural model of the joint retirement
decision of married couples and estimate this model using panel data from the NLS for Mature
Women. In the model utility depends on family lifetime consumption, the separate labor supply
of the husband and the wife, as well as the age and health of each. The value that each spouse
places on leisure is influenced by the retirement status of the other spouse. Because people who
share the same tastes are more likely to marry, the retirement preferences of the husband and
wife may be correlated. The husband and wife choose paths of consumption, work, and ultimate
retirement that maximize their preferences over a time subject to the restriction that lifetime
family consumption cannot exceed lifetime family income. As individuals age, the value of
retirement eventually outweighs the value of wages, and the individuals retire.
Gustman and Steinmeier find strong evidence for the hypothesis that husbands and wives
tend to retire together despite the younger ages of wives. Their estimation suggests that one
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reason for coordinated retirement is a coincidence of tastes for leisure. They also find that
spouses generally, but husbands in particular, value retirement more if their partner has already
retired. Gustman and Steinmeier’s modeling of the opportunity set accounts for peaks in the
retirement hazard of each spouse; however, they find that the co-ordination of opportunities is
not responsible for the co-ordination of retirement dates.
Gustman and Steinmeier (2001) use data from the HRS to gauge respondents’ knowledge
about future Social Security and pension benefits by comparing respondent reports of their
expected benefits with benefits calculated from Social Security earnings records and employer
provided descriptions of pension plans. Their results suggest general misinformation,
imprecision and lack of information about retirement benefits is the norm.
Gustman and Steinmeier (2003) construct a structural dynamic stochastic model of the
way individuals make retirement and saving choices in an uncertain world and use it to analyze
the effects of the stock market bubble on retirement behavior. The model includes individual
variation both in retirement preferences and in time preferences. Estimates are based on
information covering the period 1992 through 2000 from the HRS. The high stock market returns
in the second half of the 1990's increased retirement rates for the HRS sample of workers by over
3 percentage points and would have decreased the average retirement age by about a quarter of a
year if it had not been interrupted. The subsequent decline in the market neutralized the effect on
retirement of the preceding stock market gains. Gustman and Steinmeier speculate in their paper
that any continuing effects of the bubble after its end would probably be minimal.
More recent research by Gustman and Steinmeier (2008) addresses the topic of whether
jointly modeling the retirement behavior of two-earner couples brings with it any advantages
over modeling the retirement behavior of the two earners separately. Although the type of

7

models used by Gustman and Steinmeier is different from the one that we use in this study and
their focus is different from ours, their results are relevant to the present study since we model
only the retirement decision of the male spouse. Gustman and Steinmeier (2008) estimate
structural models of saving and retirement behavior in the face of two policies, the effects of
which are known a priori. The findings of the study suggest that joint modeling and separate
modeling give roughly the same results.
The work by David Blau primarily uses the Retirement History Survey. Blau (1994)
examines movements of older men through labor force states using quarterly observations from
the Retirement History Survey. He compares these transitions with those from the more typical
biannual records and uncovers substantial under-counts in the biannual data. He concludes that
the prevalence of labor force movements at older ages has been previously under-estimated. Blau
has also studied the retirement behavior of married couples. Under the “dependent’s benefits”
provision of Social Security a female spouse is eligible for a spousal benefit equal to 50 percent
of her husband's benefits if she chooses not to receive a retired worker benefit based on her own
earnings record. Blau (1997) uses data from the Retirement History Survey to show that the
spousal benefit provision has a small negative impact on labor force participation of older female
spouses and a small positive impact on the labor force participation of older married men.
Blau (1998) analyzes the dynamics of the joint labor force dynamics of older couples in
the United States. Using data from the Retirement History Survey, he finds strong associations
between the labor force transition probabilities of one spouse and the labor force status of the
other. Blau and Riphahn (1999) use monthly observations from the German Socio-Economic
Panel (GSOEP) to model the labor force behavior of older married couples in Germany. They
estimate a discrete-time competing-risks hazard model of transitions among labor force states
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that are defined by the employment status of both spouses. Their empirical results suggest,
broadly speaking, that spouses are more likely to move towards states in which both are
employed or in which both are not employed.
The focus of the present study is the effect of financial wealth and housing equity wealth
on the retirement decision. One important study in this regard is by Case, Quigley, and Schiller
(2005). Case, Quigley, and Schiller examine the links between increases in housing wealth,
financial wealth, and consumer spending. They draw on annual data from 14 countries and
quarterly state-level data from the United States to estimate regression models in levels, first
differences and in error-correction form relating consumption to income and wealth measures.
Case, Quigley, and Schiller find a large, statistically significant effect of housing wealth on
household consumption.
Using cross-MSA variation in house-price movements in data provided by the Office of
Housing Enterprise Oversight, Farnham and Sevak (2007) find evidence that changes in housing
wealth affect retirement timing for a sample of older workers from the HRS. They also find
evidence that housing-wealth shocks affect retirement expectations as well as present retirement
rates. They estimate that a 10 percent increase in housing wealth is associated with a reduction in
expected retirement age of between three and a half and five months.
Finally, three important recent studies examine the employment status and retirement
expectations of older U. S. workers in the wake of the recent recession, topics which are clearly
closely related to the focus of the present study. Copeland (2010) uses the March Current
Population Survey to examine how employment rates of workers aged 55 and older changed over
the period from 1987 to 2008. Copeland finds that the percentage of older workers working fulltime throughout the year increased steadily from 1993 to 2007 before decreasing during the
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recession year of 2008. Goda, Shoven, and Slavov (2010) use the HRS to investigate the
relationship between stock market performance and retirement plans over the 1998 to 2008
period. The authors find a statistically significant negative relationship between the probability
of working full-time at age 62 and the value of the S&P 500 index toward the end of their study
period. They do not, however, find strong evidence that changes in equity markets influence
changes in retirement plans over the period as a whole. They conclude that the higher
probabilities of working in recent years may be related to factors other than stock market
performance, such as pessimism about economic security. Unlike in previous recessions, layoffs
for older workers became a fact of life with the recession that started in 2007. Gustman,
Steinmeier and Tabatabai (2011) report that the percentage of retirement-age workers who were
not retired at the start of the 2000-2001 Recession and were both not working and not retired
four years later was 6.2 percent, while the comparable percentage of workers not retired in 2006
(one year before the Housing Bust) who were both not working and not retired four years later
was 11.7 percent, an increase of 4.5 percent.

Hazard Estimation
We define age at retirement as the age at the first self-report of retirement for the sample
of work-able married males drawn from the 1992 through 2012 waves of the HRS. A continuous
work histories constructed starting at age 59 can each be stopped in five ways: first, after a selfreported retirement; second, after the last wave; third, before a non-response for the retirement
question; fourth, before a wave in which the marriage ends; and fifth, before a wave in which the
male spouse is reported to be disabled. Our goal is to find the determinants of the conditional
retirement rate (retirement hazard rate) and to investigate how the determinants change after the
Housing Bust. Note that the retirement rate might be thought of as the retirement rate at a point
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in time within the calendar year or as the retirement rate for a given year. In most cases the
meaning should be clear from the context.
Suppose that a given sample is composed of N work histories. The N work histories
provide information on N independent individual retirement ages. Let Ti , a continuous variable,
be the retirement age for individuals i  1, ... , N . The hazard rate for individual i takes the
proportional hazard form developed by Cox (1972):

i (t )  0 (t ) exp( zi (t ) ) ,

(1)

where 0 (t ) is the unknown baseline hazard at time t , zi (t ) is the vector of time-varying
covariates, and  is the coefficient vector.
To estimate the coefficient vector, we use the technique proposed by Prentice and
Gloeckler (1978) as well as the adaptation of Meyer (1990) that allows controls for unobserved
heterogeneity. In the Prentice-Gloeckler technique the parameters 0 (t ) of the log-integrated
baseline hazard are non-parametrically estimated simultaneously with the coefficient vector. The
estimation method does not use the continuous quality of the duration variable, but rather
discretizes this variable into time intervals (in our study we use annual intervals). The PrenticeGloeckler technique uses the extreme-value distribution function to estimate the conditional
survivor function at age t  1 :

Pr Ti  t  1| Ti  t   exp( exp( zi (t )'    (t )))),

(2)
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where the covariate vector zi (t ) is assumed to remain constant over the period from t to t  1 .
(This type of estimation is called “grouped” or “interval-censored”.) Generally, when the
Prentice-Gloeckler technique is used, a  parameter is estimated for each interval.
The interpretation of parameters is an important component of the estimation procedure.
The  coefficients in the Prentice-Gloeckler likelihood have an interpretation similar to that of
the regression coefficients in a log-linear or semi-log regression model. In a log-linear model
where both the dependent variables and regressors are logged, a regression coefficient can be
interpreted as an elasticity. Similarly, if a regressor is logged in the Prentice-Gloeckler
likelihood, its coefficient can be interpreted as a hazard elasticity. In a semi-log regression in
which the dependent variable is logged but the regressors are not, the elasticity of the dependent
variable with respect to a regressor is given by the value the regressor times the coefficient.
Similarly, if a regressor is not logged in a Prentice-Gloeckler likelihood, its hazard elasticity is
given by the value the regressor times the coefficient.
The theoretical contribution of Meyer (1990) is to use random effects to incorporate
unobserved heterogeneity into the Prentice-Gloeckler likelihood. The resulting likelihood is now
called the Prentice-Gloeckler-Meyer likelihood. The random effect summarizes the effects of all
(unobserved) excluded regressors that are constant over the work lifetime and orthogonal to
included regressors. It is well known that failure to control for such unobserved heterogeneity
will result in inconsistent parameter estimates.
Incorporating the multiplicative random effect  into the hazard results in

i (t )  i 0 (t ) exp( zi (t )'  )

(3)

12

Meyer (1990) assumes that the random effects i are independent of the zi (t ) and are i.i.d.
Gamma variates with mean one and variance  2 .
Note that when i equals one, the value of the hazard is the same as that in the PrenticeGloeckler likelihood. This means that conditional on the random affect assuming its mean value,
the regressor coefficients have the same interpretation in both likelihoods. The PrenticeGloeckler-Meyer technique estimates the survivor function at age t  1 using the following
probability:
t


Pr Ti  t  1  1   2  exp( zi (k ) '    (k )) 
k 0



 2

(4)

The variance  2 must now be estimated together with the coefficient vector  and the  (t ) ’s.
Testing the significance of the estimate of  2 is complicated by the fact that zero is on the edge
of the parameter space. Under these conditions the appropriate critical value for a test of size 
is the critical value for a test of size 2 under standard conditions. Finally, note that when i
equals one, the value of the hazard is the same in equations (1) and (3). This means that,
conditional on the random effect assuming its mean value, the regressor coefficients and hazard
ratios have the same interpretation in the Prentice-Gloeckler-Meyer likelihood as in the PrenticeGloeckler likelihood.
In the work below, we use the formula from Follain, Ondrich, and Sinha (1997) to
examine the Prentice-Gloeckler-Meyer annual hazards at the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the
local foreclosure rate for three specific cohorts. Individuals in the first cohort reach age 65
(normal retirement age) in the year 2007; individuals in the second cohort reach age 62 (early
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retirement age) in 2007 and 65 in 2010; and individuals in the final cohort reach age 62 in 2010.
The functional form of the annual hazard is:

 1   2 gi (t ) 
ht (t )  1  

2
1   gi (t  1) 

 2

(5)

t

where gi (t )   exp( (t )  zi (t )'  ) and gi (1)  0 . For this analysis indicator variables and
s 0

control variables are assigned age-specific means.

The Data
The empirical analysis used in this study comes from the HRS, originally a longitudinal
survey of a nationally representative sample of the U.S. population 51 to 61 years old in 1992. In
1998 the sample membership of the HRS increases in size when it merges with the Asset and
Health Dynamics among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) survey and two new special cohorts are
added, the Children of the Depression Era (CODA), born in the period 1924-30 and War Babies
(WB), born in 1942-47. Since 1998 new sample members are added every six years: Early Baby
Boomers (EBB) are added in 2004, and Mid Baby Boomers (MBB) are added in 2010.
As discussed previously, a continuous work history is constructed for each sample
individual starting at age 59. Each history can be stopped in six circumstances: first, after a selfreported retirement; second, after the last wave of the HRS; third, before a non-response for the
retirement question; fourth, before a wave in which the marriage has ended; fifth, before a wave
in which the male spouse is reported to be disabled; and sixth, before a year in which the male’s
stated retirement date conflicts with previous wave statements of work. Work histories are not
included in the sample if either the husband or his wife is disabled before 1991, the first year of
the HRS. These restrictions on the disability-ability status of the spouse(s) help guarantee that a
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retirement decision is made freely and is not forced on the household by functional limitations.
After additionally dropping a handful of work histories because of missing data that cannot be
filled in any reasonable way, the number of work histories becomes 3,293. These 3,293 work
histories provide a total of 14,454 person-years to the present study.
The estimation uses six types of variables. The first type is demographic variables. The
HRS 2010 Tracker file provides the time-invariant demographic variables, while the HRS Core
provides the time-varying demographic variables. There are two race indicators, one for if the
male spouse is African-American and the second for if the male spouse is non-White and nonAfrican-American. There is an indicator for whether the male spouse has a college degree and
another for whether he reports that he is in good health. Included in the list of demographic
variables are four variables that describe the female spouse. Three of them are indicator
variables, one for whether the female spouse is disabled, one for whether the female spouse is
retired, and one for whether the female spouse has been a nonworking homemaker. The final
variable of the demographic type is meant to capture the effect of the Social Security spousal
benefit on retirement behavior. The spousal benefit will be larger if the principal breadwinner,
typically the male spouse, waits until the Social Security full retirement age before he retires.
The effect of the Social Security spousal benefit is more likely to come into play when the
female spouse is a homemaker. Therefore, the final variable of the demographic type gives the
number of years to the male spouse’s Social Security full retirement age when the female spouse
is a homemaker. The variable is zero otherwise.
There are seven workplace variables. These variables, as well as all financial and housing
wealth values, come from the Rand HRS Data Set, Version P and the Rand HRS Income and
Wealth Imputations. The first variable is the real annual log income of the female spouse, and the
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second is the real annual log income of the male spouse. (All deflated nominal values used in this
study have been deflated by the implicit GDP deflator for personal consumption expenditures
(year 2005=100) constructed by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.) Although we did not feel
that we could get accurate information on employment-related pension plans, we did create three
indicators for the type of pension plan. The first indicator is for whether the male spouse has ever
had a defined benefit plan; the second is an indicator for whether the male spouse has not had a
defined benefit plan but has had a defined contribution plan; and the third is an indicator for
whether the male spouse has both a defined benefit plan and a defined contribution plan. Finally,
we use restricted HRS data on three-digit occupation codes for the respondents to create three
occupation categories: manager/professional, office worker (including technical and sales staff),
and blue-collar. The first two indicators are included in the regressions and blue-collar is the
reference category.
We experimented with three housing variables in preliminary estimations. The first is the
log of the real home value, set to zero when the household does not own its own home. The
second variable is the log of the real value of the sum of mortgage and home loans. Both of these
variables had significant coefficients with the correct sign in virtually all of the estimations in
which they were used, although none of these results are presented here. The final variable is the
real value of home equity, real home value minus real mortgage value, in millions of dollars.
The HRS is a biannual survey, although in a few cases it may interview households three
years apart. The present work constructs annual work histories until 2012 from the HRS. We use
the 12th (2014) wave to correct self-report errors.
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One of the unique features of our preferred results is that we do not impute home equity
after 2006 based on a trend for the individual household, nor do we rely on the household’s own
assessment of home equity over the Great Recession years.
Even in cases where a household reports a value for home equity during the Great
Recession, it is likely that the household is less certain about this value compared to values in
previous years because of the nature of the substantial decline in housing demand. It is clear
from the high foreclosure rates that the ownership of many homes reverted to the lending
institutions. In order to stay liquid, these institutions sold these properties at greatly reduced
prices. The extent to which the outcomes of such sales were made public is debatable, since
municipalities had an incentive to “hide” such sales to protect their tax base. As a result, unless a
household attempted to sell its home, which fewer households did, it is unlikely that it would feel
confident about its assessment of its home equity.
Nor does it seem to be appropriate to use a value from a general house price index to
construct home equity, which can be accomplished with the HRS by combining the county
information from the restricted HRS geography data with the Federal Housing Finance Agency
MSA-level Repeat Sales House Price Index to impute home prices across the Great Recession
years. It seems likely that the decline of mean home values is smaller than the FHFA Housing
Price Index (HPI) during the Great Recession. Silva, Eren, Heiland and Martin (2010) find the
self reported home value in the HRS is approximately 10 percent higher than the final selling
price over the period 1994-2008. We suspect that this number is likely to have increased over the
period 2007-2012 because of the fall in the demand for homes.
On the other hand, households are likely to know their peak home value preceding the
Housing Bust. Because municipalities have an incentive to keep assessments high, households
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are likely to know these peak home values. Moreover, many households may have believed that
these peak values were the true long-run values. Accordingly, over the Great Recession years,
we use the 2006 value reported by households as the basis for the calculation of home equity. In
our estimation we allow the effects of the other financial variables to change during the Great
Recession as well. We use two forms of local (zip-code level) foreclosure rate in our estimation:
first, the foreclosure rate for years after 2006; and second, the same foreclosure rate with the
effect for year 2009 zeroed out (the local foreclosure rate value for the year 2009 is replaced by
zero). For both forms of the foreclosure rate variable, effects for the year 2007 are zeroed out
outside Florida, California, Arizona, the Northeast and Midwest Census regions.
We experiment with several financial wealth variables, based for the most part on real
non-housing wealth. Several variants use a two-part linear spline. The estimation presented in
this study has an unexpected sign for real non-housing wealth in the period preceding the Great
Recession. However, a spline with a knot at the median value of real non-housing wealth has an
expected sign for the lower part of the spline (lower values of real non-housing wealth) and an
unexpected sign only for the upper part of the spline (the same is true of the home equity spline).
We conjecture that the wealthiest individuals have jobs from which they do not want to retire is
not entirely unreasonable.
Since 2000 there is no longer an earnings test for Social Security for workers who retire
at or above the Social Security full retirement age (normal retirement age). By allowing these
individuals to work without actuarial penalty after previously collecting Social Security, the
average probability of an initial retirement at or after normal retirement age should have
increased. Accordingly, we include a variable interacting a post-1999 year with the male being of
normal retirement age.
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The final type of variable is the age-indicator variable. Together the age-indicator
variables allow a flexible baseline for the proportional hazard estimation.
[Insert Figure 1 here]

Results
Figure 1 presents married male annual retirement rates for both early and normal
retirement ages over the period 1994-2012. Normal retirement rates show a steady decline before
the 2008. It falls from 14.6 percent to 9.3 percent at the 2008. Although it bumps up and down
during the Great Recession, normal retirement rates are below the 2006 level. Early retirement
rates substantially fall over the period 2001-2004 from 19.5 percent to its lowest 10.2 percent. It
remains the 2 percentage points of 15 percent after the 2006. Both series show a clear reverse at
the 2009 in which the housing market is far away from the recovery. Older men who might have
delayed retirement past 2009 because of the effect of a recessionary economy on personal wealth
become more optimistic. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which includes
a broad spectrum of spending and tax cuts, provides a strong fiscal stimulus. The unemployment
rate begins to fall, and the growth rate of GDP stops decreasing, even though housing price
continues to decline.
The continued decline in the retirement rate after 2000 may be due to the elimination of
earnings test and a generous adjustment of delaying Social Security benefits. Song and Joyce
Manchester (2007) argue that increases in work participation aged 65-69 after the suspension of
the Social Security earnings test are attributable to older workers continuing to work rather than
inducing older workers back into the workforce. David M. Blau and Ryan M. Goodstein (2010)
find that increases in the Normal Retirement Age and the Delayed Retirement Credit explain one
quarter to one half of the recent increases in the labor force participation rate (their data span
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1962 to 2005, source: CPS, SIPP, SSA). Moreover, Alan Gustman and Thomas Steinmeier
(2009) alter the budget constraint in the structural model and find that approximately one-sixth of
the increase in labor force participation in Health and Retirement Study between 1998 and 2004
for married men aged 65 to 67 is due to evolving Social Security policies.
[Insert Tables 1 through 5 here]
Definitions for the variables used in the empirical analysis are presented in Table 1 and their
means and standard deviations are presented in Table 2. The results of seven models are given in
Tables 3 through 5, while calculation of the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) for these models are presented in Table 6. The degree of financial
uncertainty that starts with the Great Recession is modeled through a structural break in 2007 for
variables related to housing and non-housing financial wealth.
Whether or not married households use the pre-Recession value of their home (equity) as
a reference point (see Kahneman and Tversky 1979) is a debatable question. The level of
uncertainty about house prices undoubtedly increased during the Great Recession. Many homes
remained in a state of limbo between a homeowner who abandoned it and a bank that did not
want to be held liable for the property taxes. Municipal governments treated the sales of
foreclosed homes differently than other sales to protect a tax base inflated by housing boom
prices. If municipal governments officially acknowledge housing price declines, tax revenues
decline. On the other hand, if these governments maintain that housing prices did not decline
locally since the peak of the housing boom, tax revenues remain unaffected. To the extent that
assessments in many cases continue at peak or close to peak values during the Great Recession,
the argument that the peak values may become reference points seems to be somewhat
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Figure 1:
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Table 1
Variable Definitions
Variable
Demographic Variables
Black
Other Race
College
Health Good
Spouse Disabled
Spouse Retired
Spouse Homemaker
Spouse Homemaker x Years Off

Workplace Variables
Log Spouse Income
Log Own Income
Defined Benefit Plan
Defined Contribution Plan
Both Types of Plan
Manager or Professional
Office Worker
Housing Variables
Home Equity Spline Part 1

Definition

African-American indicator for male spouse (1=yes).
Non-White, Non- African-American indicator for male spouse
(1=yes).
College degree indicator for male spouse (1=yes).
Indicator for report of good health for male spouse (1=yes).
Indicator for disabled female spouse (1=yes).
Indicator for retired female spouse (1=yes).
Indicator for female spouse always non-working homemaker
(1=yes).
Number of years until normal retirement age of male spouse if
female spouse always non-working homemaker and zero
otherwise.
Log of female spouse’s real annual earnings ($) in year.
Log of male spouse’s real annual earnings ($) in year.
Indicator for whether male spouse has defined benefit plan
(1=yes).
Indicator for whether male spouse has no defined benefit plan but
has defined contribution plan (1=yes).
Indicator for whether male spouse has both defined benefit plan
and defined contribution plan (1=yes).
Indicator for whether male has managerial or professional
occupation(1=yes)
Indicator for whether male is office worker(1=yes)

Log Mortgage
Ownership

Part 1 of spline for real value of home equity ($ million).Variable
equals zero if not homeowner.
Part 2 of spline for real value of home equity ($ million).Variable
equals zero if not homeowner.
Real value of total home loans.
Indicator for whether male is home owner(1=yes)

Financial Variables
Financial Assets Spline Part 1
Financial Assets Spline Part 2.

Part 1 of spline for real value of non-housing wealth ($ million).
Part 2 of spline for real value of non-housing wealth ($ million)..

Post – 1999 Indicator

Indicator for whether the year is after 1999 (1=yes).

Home Equity Spline Part 2
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Table 1
Variable Definitions
(cont’d)
Variable
Great Recession Variables
Home Equity 2006
Foreclosures Started July 20xx
x Ownership
Foreclosure Started July 2009
x Ownership
Defined Benefit Plan
x Great Recession
Defined Contribution Plan
x Great Recession
Both Types of Plan
x Great Recession
Financial Assets x Great
Recession
Manager or Professional
x Great Recession
Office Worker
x Great Recession
Ownership x Great Recession

Age Indicators
Age xx
Age 71-78

Definition
Real value of home equity ($ million) interacted with Great
Recession.
Percent of homes in zip code with foreclosures started in July
2007, 2008, 2010, 2011 or 2012 interacted with ownership; = 0
in other years.
Percent of homes in zip code with foreclosures started in July
2009 interacted with ownership; =0 in other years.
Indicator for whether male spouse has defined benefit plan
(1=yes) ) interacted with Great Recession.
Indicator for whether male spouse has no defined benefit plan
but has defined contribution plan (1=yes) interacted with Great
Recession.
Indicator for whether male spouse has both defined benefit plan
and defined contribution plan (1=yes). ) interacted with Great
Recession.
Real value of financial assets ($ million) interacted with Great
Recession.
Managerial or professional occupation (1=yes) interacted with
Great Recession.
Office Worker (1=yes) interacted with Great Recession.
Indicator of home owners (1=yes) interacted with Great
Recession.

Indicator for whether male spouse is age xx in year (1=yes). The
values for xx run from 59 through to 70.
Indicator for whether male spouse is between the ages of 71 and
78 in year (1=yes).
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Table 2. Variable Means
Variable

All Years
Mean
Std Dev

Demographic Variables

Black
Other Race
College
Health Good
Spouse Disabled
Spouse Retired
Spouse Homemaker
Spouse Homemaker x Years Off

0.095
0.057
0.315
0.854
0.071
0.115
0.242
0.128

0.294
0.233
0.464
0.353
0.256
0.319
0.428
0.805

Workplace Variables
Log Spouse Income
Log Own Income
Defined Benefit Plan
Defined Contribution Plan
Both Types of Plan
Manager/Professional
Office Worker

5.940
8.634
0.135
0.436
0.084
0.345
0.184

4.782
4.110
0.341
0.496
0.277
0.475
0.388

Housing Variables
Home Equity
Ownership

0.150
0.920

0.387
0.271

Financial Variables
Financial Assets

0.388

1.353

Post – 1999 Indicator

0.643

0.480

Age Indicators
Age 59
Age 60
Age 61
Age 62
Age 63
Age 64
Age 65
Age 66
Age 67
Age 68
Age 69
Age 70
Age 71-78

0.207
0.175
0.146
0.123
0.086
0.065
0.051
0.036
0.026
0.020
0.017
0.013
0.035

0.405
0.380
0.353
0.328
0.280
0.246
0.220
0.187
0.159
0.141
0.128
0.114
0.183
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TABLE 3
PRENTICE-GLOECKLER-MEYER ESTIMATION

Variable Name
Demographic Variables
Black
Other Race
College
Very Good Health
Spouse Disabled
Spouse Retired
Spouse Homemaker
Spouse Homemaker x Years Off

Model 1
Coefficient Std Error

Model 2
Coefficient Std Error

-0.183
0.044
-0.264
-0.169
0.259
0.321
-0.219
-0.005

0.149
0.190
0.112
0.094
0.146
0.127
0.122
0.055

-0.185
0.039
-0.259
-0.168
0.255
0.319
-0.217
-0.006

0.148
0.190
0.112
0.095
0.146
0.126
0.122
0.054

Log Spouse Income
Log Own Income
Defined Benefit Plan
Defined Contribution Plan
Both Types of Plan
Manager/Professional
Office Worker

-0.021
-0.131
1.610
0.624
0.875
-0.486
-0.301

0.010
0.013
0.141
0.123
0.174
0.120
0.127

-0.021
-0.131
1.610
0.626
0.879
-0.487
-0.300

0.010
0.012
0.141
0.123
0.174
0.120
0.127

Housing Variables
Home Equity Spline Part 1
Home Equity Spline Part 2
Log Mortgage
Ownership

-0.204
-0.651
-0.036
0.773

1.555
0.342
0.008
0.212

-0.205
-0.650
-0.036
0.770

1.552
0.342
0.008
0.212

Other Wealth Variables
Non-Housing Wealth Spline Part 1
Non-Housing Wealth Spline Part 2

5.693
-0.125

1.232
0.066

5.649
-0.136

1.230
0.067

-0.669

0.328

1.493
0.559
1.240
-0.068
-0.446
0.052
-0.086

0.257
0.170
0.260
0.180
0.213
0.202
0.085

-0.549
-0.098
1.476
0.552
1.235
-0.052
-0.427
0.061
-0.088

0.344
0.096
0.257
0.170
0.260
0.180
0.213
0.202
0.085

Workplace Variables

Great Recession Variables
Equity 2006
Non-Housing Wealth x Great Recession
Defined Benefit Plan x Great Recession
Defined Compensation x Great Recession
Both Types of Plan x Great Recession
Manager/Professional x Great Recession
Office Worker x Great Recession
Ownership x Great Recession
Post 1999
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TABLE 3 (cont’d)
PRENTICE-GLOECKLER-MEYER ESTIMATION

Variable Name
Age Indicators
Age 59
Age 60
Age 61
Age 62
Age 63
Age 64
Age 65
Age 66
Age 67
Age 68
Age 69
Age 70
Age 71-78
Gamma Variance
Log L
LR test between Model 1 and Model 2 =

Model 1
Coefficient Std Error

-3.067
-2.661
-2.505
-0.946
-1.007
-1.110
-0.387
-0.118
-0.412
-0.414
-0.479
-0.233
-0.290

0.241
0.241
0.248
0.256
0.290
0.321
0.349
0.393
0.446
0.484
0.522
0.547
0.574

1.207
0.291
-3930.463
1.130

Model 2
Coefficient Std Error

-3.064
-2.659
-2.503
-0.947
-1.010
-1.113
-0.390
-0.122
-0.418
-0.422
-0.487
-0.239
-0.296

0.240
0.240
0.247
0.255
0.289
0.319
0.347
0.391
0.444
0.481
0.519
0.543
0.570

1.193
0.289
-3929.898
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TABLE 4
PRENTICE-GLOECKLER-MEYER ESTIMATION

Variable Name
Demographic Variables
Black
Other Race
College
Very Good Health
Spouse Disabled
Spouse Retired
Spouse Homemaker
Spouse Homemaker x Years Off

Model 3
Coefficient Std Error

Model 4
Coefficient Std Error

-0.192
0.027
-0.271
-0.170
0.269
0.324
-0.236
-0.006

0.151
0.194
0.114
0.096
0.149
0.129
0.125
0.055

-0.195
0.024
-0.261
-0.166
0.259
0.320
-0.229
-0.007

0.149
0.191
0.113
0.095
0.147
0.127
0.123
0.055

Log Spouse Income
Log Own Income
Defined Benefit Plan
Defined Contribution Plan
Both Types of Plan
Manager/Professional
Office Worker

-0.022
-0.132
1.610
0.615
0.854
-0.496
-0.309

0.011
0.013
0.143
0.125
0.178
0.123
0.129

-0.022
-0.130
1.608
0.620
0.868
-0.492
-0.304

0.011
0.013
0.142
0.124
0.175
0.121
0.128

Housing Variables
Home Equity Spline Part 1
Home Equity Spline Part 2
Log Mortgage
Ownership

-0.232
-0.540
-0.037
0.780

1.571
0.336
0.008
0.215

-0.234
-0.571
-0.037
0.773

1.558
0.336
0.008
0.213

Other Wealth Variables
Non-Housing Wealth Spline Part 1
Non-Housing Wealth Spline Part 2

5.776
-0.121

1.249
0.066

5.664
-0.135

1.239
0.067

-25.223
-4.747

10.536
10.187

1.518
0.560
1.251
-0.103
-0.475
0.150
-0.084

0.262
0.173
0.264
0.182
0.216
0.215
0.086

-24.226
-4.201
-0.140
1.482
0.552
1.245
-0.063
-0.437
0.176
-0.087

10.501
10.153
0.094
0.261
0.171
0.263
0.181
0.214
0.214
0.085

Workplace Variables

Great Recession Variables
Foreclosure Rate
Foreclosure Rate x Year 2009
Non-Housing Wealth x Great Recession
Defined Benefit Plan x Great Recession
Defined Compensation x Great Recession
Both Types of Plan x Great Recession
Manager/Professional x Great Recession
Office Worker x Great Recession
Ownership x Great Recession
Post 1999
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TABLE 4 (cont’d)
PRENTICE-GLOECKLER-MEYER ESTIMATION

Variable Name
Age Indicators
Age 59
Age 60
Age 61
Age 62
Age 63
Age 64
Age 65
Age 66
Age 67
Age 68
Age 69
Age 70
Age 71-78
Gamma Variance
Log L
LR test between Model 3 and Model 4 =

Model 3
Coefficient Std Error

-3.055
-2.645
-2.483
-0.915
-0.963
-1.058
-0.323
-0.045
-0.336
-0.334
-0.389
-0.139
-0.210

0.244
0.244
0.252
0.262
0.299
0.332
0.362
0.410
0.464
0.505
0.545
0.572
0.602

1.281
0.310
-3929.337
2.536

Model 4
Coefficient Std Error

-3.058
-2.651
-2.493
-0.933
-0.991
-1.090
-0.360
-0.090
-0.389
-0.393
-0.451
-0.202
-0.273

0.241
0.242
0.249
0.258
0.293
0.325
0.355
0.401
0.454
0.494
0.533
0.559
0.585

1.223
0.301
-3928.069
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Table 5
PRENTICE-GLOECKLER-MEYER ESTIMATION

Variable Name

Model 5
Std
Coefficient Error

Model 6
Std
Coefficient Error

Model 7
Std
Coefficient Error

Demographic Variables
Black

-0.195

0.149

-0.196

0.148

-0.179

0.151

0.037

0.191

0.032

0.190

0.033

0.194

College

-0.257

0.112

-0.252

0.112

-0.281

0.114

Very Good Health

-0.166

0.095

-0.164

0.095

-0.174

0.096

Spouse Disabled

0.253

0.147

0.249

0.146

0.279

0.149

Spouse Retired

0.322

0.127

0.320

0.126

0.324

0.129

Spouse Homemaker

-0.222

0.123

-0.221

0.122

-0.233

0.125

Spouse Homemaker x Years Off

-0.006

0.055

-0.007

0.054

-0.006

0.055

Log Spouse Income

-0.021

0.010

-0.021

0.010

-0.022

0.011

Log Own Income

-0.130

0.012

-0.130

0.012

-0.133

0.013

Defined Benefit Plan

1.606

0.141

1.606

0.141

1.616

0.143

Defined Contribution Plan

0.621

0.123

0.623

0.123

0.617

0.126

Other Race

Workplace Variables

Both Types of Plan

0.869

0.175

0.874

0.174

0.857

0.178

Manager or Professional

-0.488

0.120

-0.489

0.120

-0.495

0.123

Office Worker

-0.301

0.127

-0.299

0.127

-0.311

0.130

Home Equity Spline Part 1

-0.256

1.554

-0.256

1.550

-0.171

1.576

Home Equity Spline Part 2

-0.652

0.342

-0.651

0.342

-0.524

0.336

Log Mortgage

-0.037

0.008

-0.037

0.008

-0.036

0.008

0.778

0.212

0.776

0.212

0.774

0.215

Non-Housing Wealth Spline Part 1

5.663

1.233

5.619

1.230

5.827

1.251

Non-Housing Wealth Spline Part 2

-0.125

0.066

-0.133

0.067

-0.119

0.066

-0.604

0.327

-0.491

0.343

-23.184

10.436

-22.886

10.441

-3.534

9.970

-3.397

9.994

-0.093

0.096

Housing Variables

Ownership
Other Wealth Variables

Great Recession Variables
Equity 2006
Foreclosure Rate
Foreclosure Rate * Year 2009
Non-Housing Wealth x Great Recession
Defined Benefit Plan x Great Recession

1.484

0.258

1.468

0.258

1.533

0.263

Defined Contribution x Great Recession

0.570

0.171

0.563

0.170

0.546

0.173
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TABLE 5 (cont’d)
PRENTICE-GLOECKLER-MEYER ESTIMATION

Model 5
Variable Name
Both Types of Plan x Great Recession

Model 6

Coefficient

Std
Error

Model 7

Coefficient

Std
Error

Coefficient

Std
Error

1.251

0.261

1.245

0.261

1.237

0.263

Manager or Professional x Great Recession

-0.051

0.181

-0.036

0.180

-0.127

0.182

Office Worker x Great Recession

-0.435

0.213

-0.417

0.213

-0.494

0.216

0.209

0.215

0.216

0.214

-0.031

0.201

-0.085

0.085

-0.087

0.085

-0.086

0.086

Age 59

-3.073

0.241

-3.070

0.240

-3.045

0.244

Age 60

-2.667

0.241

-2.665

0.240

-2.635

0.245

Age 61

-2.510

0.248

-2.509

0.247

-2.472

0.253

Age 62

-0.953

0.256

-0.955

0.255

-0.899

0.264

Age 63

-1.015

0.290

-1.019

0.287

-0.944

0.300

Age 64

-1.115

0.322

-1.120

0.320

-1.041

0.333

Age 65

-0.391

0.350

-0.397

0.348

-0.304

0.363

Age 66

-0.127

0.394

-0.132

0.392

-0.021

0.411

Age 67

-0.428

0.447

-0.436

0.444

-0.301

0.467

Age 68

-0.432

0.485

-0.442

0.482

-0.295

0.507

Age 69

-0.492

0.524

-0.503

0.520

-0.354

0.547

Age 70

-0.244

0.548

-0.254

0.545

-0.104

0.574

Age 71-78

-0.313

0.574

-0.323

0.570

-0.162

0.605

Gamma Variance

1.202

0.292

1.186

0.289

1.302

0.312

Log Likelihood

-3927.482

Ownership x Great Recession
Post 1999
Age Indicators

-3926.986

LR test between model 5 and model 6 =

0.992

LR test between model 5 and model 7 =

12.768

-3932.726
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strengthened. Unless they sell their home, the peak value is the only true value that homeowners
know.
Models that we estimate are consistent with the idea that households use peak housing
values as a reference point after the Great Recession starts. Households are uncertain about the
true current value of their home. Households are certain only about the peak value of their home
and the fact that the true current value is substantially lower than the peak. The greater is the
peak value, the greater is the amount of wealth possibly lost. So, if households respond to lost
wealth by delaying retirement, a possible conclusion to be drawn is that Great-Recession
retirement rates are lower, the higher is the peak value of housing.
The Prentice-Gloeckler-Meyer estimation results for the first self-reported retirement of
male spouses using the pre-Recession peak housing value to calculate 2006 home equity are
presented in Table 3. The effect of financial wealth after 2006 is excluded in Model 1 and
included in Model 2.3 Corresponding estimation results using the local foreclosure rate4 and not
2006 home equity are presented in Table 4. Models 5 and 6 in Table 5 include both 2006 home
equity and the local foreclosure rate. Model 7 is the baseline model for model selection; it
excludes 2006 home equity, the local foreclosure rate and financial wealth variables in the post2006 period.
Table 6 gives BIC and AIC for the seven models. Because of the large number of
parameters in our study, model selection penalties for additional parameters using BIC are

3
4

Similarly, in Tables 3 through 5 even-numbered models include post-2006 financial wealth while odd-numbered models do not.

The local foreclosure rate represents the percentage of homes in the zip code for which foreclosure proceeding start in the first
week of July of the given calendar year. The variable is zeroed out for renters. In 2007, the start of the Great Recession, the
variable is zeroed out for residents of states other than California, Arizona, Florida and those in the Northeast and Midwest. For
2009 only, the variable has a new value for residents of all states.
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substantially larger than those using AIC. In our case this means that BIC will always choose the
model with fewer additional parameters, while AIC may choose the larger model. Therefore, we
will use AIC as our model selection criterion. AIC indicates that Model 5, the model including
2006 home equity and the local foreclosure rate but excluding financial wealth in the post-2006
period, is best. Figure 2 presents the predicted retirement rates from Model 5. It captures the
empirical retirement rates in Figure 1 very well.
[Insert Table 6 and Figure 2 here]
The first important result in Model 5 is that the coefficients of the 2006 home equity and the
local foreclosure rate for the post-2006 period are jointly significant negative. The second
important result is that unobserved heterogeneity matters. The Gamma-distributed random effect
is significantly greater than zero at the 1 percent level.
Looking next at the demographic variables, race does not matter for retirement behavior,
but having a college degree and being in good health both significantly delay retirement. Male
spouses are more likely to retire if their wives have already retired. This is consistent with the
life cycle theories and other studies claiming couples will jointly retire and enjoy more leisure
together. Male spouses are less likely to retire if their wives are homemakers.
The workplace variables are better predictors of retirement behavior than the
demographic variables. A married male will delay his retirement the higher is his own income,
and the higher is his wife’s income.
The effect of having a defined benefit plan apparently swamps the effect of having a
defined contribution plan, although having either type of plan significantly increases the
retirement hazard rate. These results do not change qualitatively in the period after 2006.
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Table 6: Model Selection Criteria

Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
Model 7

BIC
8170.768
8176.844
8175.722
8180.392
8179.226
8185.431
8168.089

AIC
7946.926
7947.796
7946.674
7946.138
7944.972
7945.972
7949.452
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Figure 2:

Predicted Retirement Rate, 1997-2012
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For the pre-Great Recession years, married males who own a home tend to retire earlier,
but this effect is mitigated the greater is any mortgage. Home equity enters the specifications as a
two-part spline with the knot at the median pre-2007 level of home equity ($94K in 2005
dollars). Both parts of the spline have coefficients that are insignificantly negative at the 5
percent level based on a two-tailed test. A possible reason for these signs is that married males
with greater home equity do not retire as early because they have jobs that they find pleasant. But
note that the point estimate of the coefficient for the home-ownership indicator dominates the
effect of home equity so that the combined effect is positive.
The situation changes with the Housing Bust. We have argued that, after the Housing
Bust, homeowners become more uncertain about current and future values of homes and that
retirement is delayed when the uncertainty and possible equity loss, which is correlated with preHousing Bust home values, increases. The coefficient on home equity is negative with a onetailed p-value of 0.0301. The coefficient has the same magnitude as the second part of the homeequity spline before the Housing Bust. So, we cannot conclusively say that married males who
own their homes delay retirement because of concerns over possible equity loss, because we
cannot rule out job satisfaction as the reason for the delay. However, the coefficient of the homeownership indicator has become insignificant, suggesting that housing wealth matters less after
the Housing Bust.
[Insert Figures 3, 4 and 5 here]
The coefficient on the local foreclosure rate has a p-value less than 0.01, suggesting that a
higher foreclosure rate decreases the retirement rate of homeowners. (The LR Chi-square of joint
significance for home equity and the local foreclosure rate also has a p-value less than 0.01.)
Figures 3-5 present the average predicted retirement rates based on model 5 for three cohorts at
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the 10th percentile, median, and 90th percentile values for the local foreclosure rate over the
period from 2007 to 2012. The largest difference between the 10th percentile and the 90th
percentile is always at early retirement age and at normal retirement age. The retirement rate of
10th percentile would decrease by about 25 percent if a male were living in an area with the 90th
percentile foreclosure rate.
The level of financial assets in years before 2007 enters the specifications as a two-part
spline with the knot at the median pre-2007 level of financial assets ($107K in 2005 dollars). The
first part of the spline (to the left of the knot)) is significantly positive with a p-value less than
0.01. This is consistent with the hypothesis that households with more wealth retire earlier. The
second part of the spline, with higher values of financial wealth, is negative but insignificant.
The retirement hazard rate increases sharply at early retirement age and again at normal
retirement age. It declines gradually thereafter.

Summary
This study uses Health and Retirement Study data from waves 1992 through 2012
together with restricted SSA data on geographic location to estimate a model of the age at first
self-reported retirement for the subsample of married males. The model covariates include
demographic variables, workplace variables, non-housing financial wealth, and housing equity.
We estimate proportional hazard models with controls for unobserved heterogeneity and find that
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity improves the fit. The proportional hazard estimates are,
for the most part, significant and of the correct sign. The model estimates are consistent with the
hypothesis that uncertainty about the extent of current and future declines in housing wealth after
the Housing Bust significantly delayed the retirement of married males. In particular, the effect
of local foreclosures on the retirement rate significantly decreased retirement rates in four parts
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of the country (Northeast, Midwest, Florida, and Arizona/California) in 2007. The effect was
national by 2008.
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Figure 3:

Conditional Retirement Rate of 1942 Birth Cohort
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Figure 4:

Conditional Retirement Rate of 1945 Birth Cohort
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Figure 5:

Conditional Retirement Rate of 1948 Birth Cohort
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Chapter 2
Outline
The aging population has become substantially larger as baby boomers have started
entering the end of their working lifetime, when the security provided by wealth becomes more
important. Approximately 80 percent of households near retirement age are homeowners and
housing wealth is the principal form of savings for the majority of households. This figure
declines only slightly until age 80, after which there is greater mortality and nursing home
utilization.
It is still a puzzle why the elderly rarely tap into housing wealth. Hurd and Smith (2001)
find that death and medical expenses do not substantially reduce the size of estates in the Asset
and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD). Venti and Wise (2004) find that elderly
movers are not typically taking substantial home equity out of their housing wealth to support
other consumption. Furthermore, couples are even likely to move into more expensive homes
after entering retirement or widowhood. Few elderly American households have sufficient
financial wealth for increasing medical costs. In fact, the total wealth (including housing wealth)
of many older workers may be inadequate unless they are willing to move into smaller homes
(Skinner 2007). Recently, a growing empirical literature argues that consumption responds to
house price movements, thus suggesting housing wealth should not be ignored in the dynamic
consumption model (Campbell and Cocco 2007; Mian, Rao, and Sufi et al. 2013.). On the other
hand, an increasing number of studies construct life cycle models with durable consumption and
examine the effects of housing wealth on non-durable consumption, asset accumulation,
financial investment and labor incentives.
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Ondrich and Falevich (2015) estimate hazard models to show that significant declines in
housing wealth delay retirement. If consumers only expect a slow recovery from large housing
price declines, borrowing constraints related to housing wealth may hurt their ability for smooth
consumption after retirement and force them to work more. Furthermore, housing wealth plays
an important role in the precautionary saving and bequest motive. It may be used to pay
unexpected medical costs and large funeral fees. In addition, a desired bequest level may force
elderly households to work more and leave more non-housing wealth to offset the loss of
housing wealth. Although housing investment decisions are not considered, the purpose of this
paper is to study the role of housing wealth on retirement plans in a structural framework.
There are four possible explanations why the elderlies are reluctant to tap housing wealth.
The first one is psychological. The elderly may find it difficult to leave a place where they have
lived for a long time and have a well-established social network. The second explanation is that
home ownership may provide utility. The third explanation is precautionary savings. An
uncertain lifespan and medical costs are two large contingencies for the elderly. Venti and Wise
(2004) argue that housing wealth is ideal for future contingencies because home equity can easily
be used to finance unexpected shocks. However, they note that utilization of reverse mortgages
and selling homes are available options not commonly used by retirees. The fourth explanation is
the bequest motive. When the elderlies treat their children as their own extended lives, planning
a bequest of housing wealth is reasonable. Incorporating bequests into an economic model is
problematic. Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes (2002) explain that it is virtually impossible to
distinguish a bequest from precautionary saving.
To study retirement behavior, it is important to take account of non-housing resources
available to households as well. Social Security is one of the important source of income
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affecting the living standards of the elderly. Unfortunately, Social Security expenditures already
represent a large portion of government spending. In 2002 Social Security expenditures
accounted for 22.6 percent of Federal spending5. Moreover, these expenditures are expected to
increase substantially as baby boomers begin to the retire and the program's future solvency is a
major policy concern.
The goal of Social Security is to provide insurance against a long lifespan. However,
Social Security distorts incentives to work and may cause people to retire early (see.French 2005,
and Blundell, French, and Tetlow 2017). According to previous studies, for example, Blau
(1994), French (2005), French and Jones (2011), and Gustman and Steinmeier (2015), there is a
spike in the retirement rate at early retirement age. Some unusual application strategies can
maximize Social Security wealth, but we find little evidence that the elderly know about those
strategies. Hence, we do not attempt to model non-standard application strategies. Finally,
because sample members in the sample used in this study were born between 1940 and 1945,
Social Security rules enacted in 2000 that eliminate the earnings test after the normal retirement
age apply.
Pensions and spousal income outside of Social Security are also included as liquid assets
in our model, even though we do not distinguish between single, widowed and coupled males.
Although males with any marital status may be sample members, wealth measurements in the
Health and Retirement Study (HRS) are at the household level. Pensions are included in our
model as annuities, and spousal income is included as a determinate function of male health and
age.

5

URL: https://www.ssa.gov/history/percent.html
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Medical costs, health insurance and Medicare are the focus of several studies in the last
decade (see, for example, Rust and Phelan 1997, French 2005, De Nardi, French, and Jones
2010, and French and Jones 2011). It is important to include these factors in a discussion of
retirement behavior. Poor health not only limits the functional ability but also induces higher
medical expenses for the elderly. Time persistence of medical costs accelerates the decline of
liquid wealth. Moreover, if the elderlies suffer from severe health problems and must move to a
nursing home, the extraordinarily high medical costs may force them to tap housing wealth.
Medicare may be the main reason for a second-high retirement rate peak at age 65, because
deduction of medical costs from Medicare decreases out-of-pocket medical costs. Our model
considers the dynamics of medical costs through three insurance types: no insurance, retiree
covered insurance and job-tied insurance. This insurance categorization follows the model of
French and Jones (2011).
In summary, this paper studies retirement and saving behavior and the bequest motive
through housing wealth in a world of risks, with five main sources of uncertainty: health status,
wage, medical cost, and mortality risk as determined partially by health status, as well as housing
prices. We construct a life-cycle model with wealth and bequest components and distinguish
between liquid assets and housing wealth. We experiment with the two asset accumulations and
constraints and examine the savings behavior in the presence of housing wealth. The most
relevant financial variables are carefully addressed. Additionally, we take into account the strong
bequest motive among wealthy households and the manner in which social welfare programs
affect poor households. The Method of Simulated Moments (MSM) is used to estimate
parameters in the life cycle model. Robustness checks are based on the models without housing
wealth and heterogeneity.
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The literature review is presented in the following section. It includes important studies in
Social Security, retirement, housing, saving behavior, and methodologies. The third section
develops the construction of a life cycle dynamic model. Two alternative asset accumulation
equations to cope with housing wealth are compared and discussed. The first takes into account
the "imaginary" part of housing wealth in the liquid asset accumulation. The other one follows
two traditional types of consumption model with a collateral constraint. The purpose is to
account for households with high housing wealth but low non-housing wealth. The fourth section
describes the data preparation and profile estimation. This is followed by a discussion of the
moment conditions and methodology used in the paper. The methodology contains the numerical
solution to the dynamic programming problem and Minimum Distance Estimation to identify the
parameters. The sixth section presents the estimation results, model fitness and robustness check,
followed by a comparison of three counterfactual experiments. The final section presents
conclusion and discussion.

Literature Review
In the last two decades, many papers show that Social Security is one of the main reasons
for the high retirement rate at age 62 and availability of Medicare causes another peak at normal
retirement age6. Rust and Phelan (1997) implement Rust's dynamic discrete choice framework to
analyze how Social Security and Medicare affect the labor supply of poorer households. Saving
behavior is not modeled, but the model fits actual labor supply behavior and accounts for the
spikes in retirement at 62 and 65. However, liquidity constraints and saving behavior may be
needed to study the effects of the Social Security rules on lifetime labor supply more generally

6

Social Security Disability Insurance is an important part of the Social Security program. This paper mainly focuses on the
retirement benefits.
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(French 2005). Blau (2008) shows that median assets in the HRS grow until people are in their
later 60s. Furthermore, French and Jones (2011) take account of health insurance and medical
costs in their structural model and find that people without health insurance are more likely to
retire at the normal retirement age, while people with health insurance are more likely to
continue to work. None of these studies separate housing wealth from total wealth.
Some reduced-form studies conclude that Social Security is one of the main reasons older
workers retire at age 62. Blau (1994) analyzes labor force movements of older men using
quarterly data from the Retirement History Survey, and his estimates indicate that Social
Security benefits have strong effects on labor force transitions of older men. Medicare
availability may cause the retirement spike at age 65. Using an option-value model, Coile and
Gruber (2007) implement forward-looking models and invent a new measure which they call
peak value to show that higher future Social Security benefits delay retirement. However,
reduced-form studies often model retirement and Social Security claim as simultaneous
decisions. An exception is Hurd, Smith and Zissimopoulos (2004), who use a bivariate probit
model to study Social Security claim and retirement behavior at age 62. They find that people
with a high subjective survival probability retire earlier and claim Social Security earlier. The
advantage of the dynamic programming model which we use is that it allows households to be
forward-looking and make various decisions interactively.
It is not clear how well structural models can predict actual Social Security claiming
behavior in the face of rules and economic environment changes. Many policy changes increase
the gains from delays in claiming, particularly for cohorts that are eligible to collect Social
Security after 2000. It has been shown theoretically that postponing the claiming of Social
Security is advantageous for most individuals, especially couples, given increases in life
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expectancy and recent declines in interest rates (Shoven and Slavov, 2012, 2013). However,
empirical evidence does not agree. Gustman and Steinmeier (2015) use the MSM technique to
estimate an enhanced version of a structural model that jointly explains benefit claiming, wealth
and retirement with uncertain interest rates and wages. They find that the observed timing of
claims in the HRS is earlier than the optimal timing. They estimate that observed timing and
optimal timing would coincide if benefits were cut 20 percent, suggesting that individuals expect
benefit cuts in the future.
In the traditional life-cycle model, a significant decline in housing prices should have a
strong impact on life-cycle wealth and hence on retirement consumption and other related
behavior. Skinner (1996) takes advantage of housing windfalls during the 1970s to study
consumption responses and argues that housing wealth is not a sideshow. But if households do
not tap housing wealth, how is housing wealth embodied into the budget constraint? Rising
house prices may stimulate consumption by increasing household's perceived present and
expected future wealth or by relaxing borrowing constraints. Campbell and Cocco (2007) find
that regional house prices affect growth in regional consumption, but do not provide a structural
justification. There are some studies on housing wealth and life-cycle portfolio choices (Cocco
2004, Yogo 2016). Kaplan and Violante (2014) develop an optimal life cycle model with two
assets and replicate the phenomenon that many households hold little or no liquid wealth despite
owning sizable quantities of illiquid assets. They solve the long-term Euler equation for housing
investment and compare it to the short-term one. They find strong wealth effects on
consumption.
Precaution against future contingencies is the primary reason for saving. The Survey of
Consumer Finance Finds the primary reason to be retirement (for 45 percent of households),
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emergency or illness (40 percent), and estate (15 percent) (Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes, 2002).
Bequests are likely to be luxury goods. Although households may care about leaving money to
their descendants, adding a bequest motive on top of an existing motive for precautionary saving
would have relatively little impact on capital accumulation for nearly all households, except
maybe those at the highest wealth level. De Nardi (2004) develops a quantitative overlappinggenerations model in which parents and children are linked by voluntary bequests and replicates
empirical wealth inequality in old age: bequests are luxury goods.
Recently, more attention has been paid to durable consumption in the life-cycle model.
Cocco (2004) studies the effect of housing wealth on the portfolio choice of stock and bond
investment in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Campbell and Cocco (2014) extend
Coco's model to incorporate fixed and adjustable rate mortgages and construct a structural
mortgage-default model. In the labor field, Aaronson, Agarwal and French (2013) include
housing wealth in asset accumulation and study the spending and debt response to changes in the
minimum wage. Including housing wealth allows the agents to have debt on an asset and
guarantees no bankruptcy through a collateral constraint. Nakajima and Telyukova (2017) give a
thorough study of the utilization of reverse mortgage loans in the HRS. Many of the models are
partial equilibrium in the sense that housing price is exogenous. The study by Burnside,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2016) is an exception. Their study successfully generates the boombust episodes when skeptical agents happen to be correct.
Because of computational improvements, more complex structural models can now be
estimated. Discrete choice dynamic programming is widely used in labor economics, industrial
organization, and other fields. General surveys are found in Rust (1994), Aguirregabiria and
Mira (2010), and Todd, Wolpin, and Keane (2010). Rust (1987) proposes a framework for
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estimating parameters in structural models and uses it empirically solve the optimal bus-engine
replacement problem. Rust (1994) describes the process of dynamic structural model estimation
and both partial and full information estimators in detail. By imposing an extreme value
distribution, the likelihood function becomes closed form and easily estimated by maximum
likelihood estimation (MLE). However, when decisions are continuous and unobservable, like
consumption, the MLE method becomes difficult. As an alternative, McFadden (1989) develops
the MSM to deal with high-dimensional decisions. The criterion is minimization of weighted
mean-square error. Epple and Sieg (1999) extend this technique to estimate quantile moments.
Rust (1997) proves that the Monte Carlo randomization method in dynamic models is useful to
break the curse of dimensionality and asymptotically approaches a normal distribution. Empirical
applications are Gourinchas and Parker (2002) for consumer behavior, French (2005) for
retirement, and Del Boca, Flinn, and Wiswall (2014) for education investment.

Forward-Looking Structural Model
The starting point is the structural model developed by French and Jones (2011). A
representative agent faces five time-varying uncertainties: mortality, wages, housing price, health
status, and latent health-dependent re-entry type. Utility at time t takes the Cobb-Douglas form:
ut (Ct , Lt ) 

1
*(Ct * L1t )1
1 

(6)

where Ct is consumption at age t , and Lt is leisure at age t . The within-period leisure
constraint is given by:
L  Lt  Hourst   0 * I ( Healtht  bad ) 

 w * I ( Part  1)   r * I ( Part  1| Part 1  0, Rt  1)

(7)

49

where L is the total time endowment, Hourst is the chosen number of working hours,  0 is the
time cost of poor health,  w is the time cost of labor force participation and Part is one if the
individual chooses to be in the labor force at age t ,  r is the time cost of labor force re-entry. Rt
is the dependent re-entry latent class type (re-entry is possible only for individuals with Rt equal
to one); Rt is a logit probability, the index function for which falls with poor health and as
individuals age.
The time cost of labor force participation is given by:

 w  1   2 (t  60)

(8)

where 1 is the fixed time cost of working, and  2 is the age-dependent variable time cost of
working. These two time costs take into account the empirical clustering of working hours at 0
and 2000 hours per year, and allow leisure to be more valuable when people get older.  r is zero
when there is lagged labor-force participation or the current re-entry is not possible. If retirees
want to work again, they experience loss of leisure to find a new job. More details on Rr are
presented in the profile estimation section. The model is a partial equilibrium of labor supply
market in which wage is exogenous. To determine wages within the model, we calibrate the
wage elasticity from French and Jones (2011).
Asset accumulation within the model is determined by five resources: wages, Social
Security benefits, private pensions, spousal income and an unknown proportion of housing
wealth. Given that we do not allow bankruptcy, assets should be non-negative. But putting
housing wealth into the assets accumulation equation directly will allow those who are housing
rich but financially poor to sometimes be in violation of the nonnegative asset constraint. To
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prevent this from happening, we impose a collateral constraint. Housing wealth is taken to be
exogenous. Kaplan and Violante (2015) provide an excellent life-cycle model with housing
choice. For downsizing homes, readers can refer to Yogo (2016). The asset accumulation
equation is given by:
At 1   * H t 1  At   * H t  Yt  Ct  M t

(9)

At  0, t

(10)

where At is non-housing assets, H t is housing wealth, Yt is after-tax household income
including Social Security and pension benefits and return on assets, Ct is a consumption, and
M t is medical costs.  is an unknown parameter that captures the percentage of housing wealth

that households view as liquid. Thus, consumer and saving behaviors are affected by housing
wealth. When solving the optimization, we move the term of  * H t to the left side and use
At 1   *( H t 1  H t ) as total assets.

We use the 2004 head of households tax formula from taxfoundation.org to obtain
available after-tax income. After-tax income is given by:
Yt  Y (Wt * Hourst  Bt * SSt  pst  spt  r * At , )

(11)

where Wt is the hourly wage rate, SSt is Social Security benefits, Bt is the Social Security
application decision, pst is pension benefits, spt is spousal income, and r * At is the return on
assets. The interest rate is set equal to 2.5 percent.
A modified model comprises the original model with a modified asset accumulation
process. The modified version is given by:
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At 1  At  Yt  Ct  M t

(12)

At   eqline * H t , t

(13)

where At is allowed to be negative, but debt cannot be larger than the equity line on housing
wealth. The equity line percentage is set to 0.75 across the entire life cycle. Moreover, there is no
fixed cost from borrowing housing wealth. The results of the modified model improve the asset
accumulation performance over the original model results.
Government provided aid guarantees a minimum consumption level for households.
Because of these social welfare programs, households with low assets may be reluctant to save.
The government transfers equation is based on Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1994):
trt  max 0, C floor  ( At  Yt  M t )

(14)

where trt is government transfers at time t , and C floor is the guaranteed consumption floor.
There are many social welfare programs for poor households, such as SSI, food stamps, and
Medicaid. Transfers take place after agents run out of current cash-on-hand and are triggered at
the next period. Therefore, poor families tend to maintain low assets to obtain government
transfers. If growing housing wealth increases consumption and decreases savings, it may
impose more financial burden on the social welfare program.
If the agent dies in the next period, total wealth is the input of the bequest function. With
no bequest motive, total wealth is optimally exhausted at the final period. However, empirical
evidence shows a great amount of wealth left upon the elderly's death. Lee Lockwood (2012)
summarizes properties of different bequest functions in theoretical and empirical studies. The
empirical bequest equation is given by:

52

( At 1  H t 1   k )(1 )*
bt ( At 1  H t 1 )  b *
1 

(15)

where  b is marginal propensity of consumption from bequest, and  k is the curvature of the
bequest function. Importantly, the original and modified models include housing wealth in the
bequest motive. One robustness check eliminates housing wealth from the bequest component.
Intuitively, if  b is high, the consumption path will also be higher and wealth path lower.  k is
the curvature of the bequest equation. Families with total wealth above  k will leave a bequest.
Given the above setup, the Bellman equation is:
Vt ( St ; )  Max(Ct , Hourt , Bt )U t   * st 1 *

E Vt 1 ( St 1 ; ) | St , d t    *(1  st 1 ) * bt ( At 1  H t 1 ), t  55,...,85

(16)

where S t is the set of state variables at time t , st is the conditional survival probability at time
t , and d t represents the set of decision variables.  is the set of unknown parameters,

 ,  , , L, , , , , , , C
0

1

2

r

b

k
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,  .

The econometric methodology is based on John Rust's framework combined with MSM.
Belief equations constituting an individual's profile are estimated before estimating preference
parameters. Belief equations are independent during estimation7. Preference estimation is
performed in two loops. In the inner loop, we use backward induction to solve maximization of
the Bellman equation. Discretization is used to address continuous state variables. We use
Tauchen's (1986) method to generate the Markov transition matrix for wage innovations and

7

This is the conditional independent assumption in John Rust (1994). Full information estimation needs to adjust data generating
process during preference parameters estimation. To save time, we use partial information estimation.
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medical cost innovations. Because the housing price innovation is i.i.d, five-point Gaussian
quadrature is used to solve the expectation of the home price. After solving the dynamic
programming problem, three-dimension linear interpolation is used to obtain solutions for
consumption, working hours, participation, and Social Security application. In the outer loop, we
use the simplex method and MSM to estimate parameters by minimizing the distance between
simulated and observed moments.

Data and Life-Cycle Profile
HRS Data
We use the HRS to estimate. The main dataset is Rand HRS version p, which includes
data from 1992 to 2014. HRS surveys respondents are interviewed every two years and new
cohorts are added into the survey every six years. The respondents in our sample are born
between 1941 and 1945. The reasons for choosing these particular cohorts are twofold. First, the
youngest respondents are age 69 in the year 2014, which are the last moment age and last
calendar year, respectively, in the survey. Second, the normal retirement age can be fixed at age
66. The average birth year is close to 1943. For the 1940 cohort, the normal retirement age is 65
and six months. Normal retirement age gradually increases to age 66 for birth years after 1937
and before 1954. On the other hand, we drop respondents who do not pay Social Security tax for
five years and work for the government. The effect of private pension plans is higher than Social
Security for these respondents. Moreover, some are not eligible for Social Security benefits. To
make the sample larger, we do not drop the respondents who collect Social Security Disability
benefits.
Labor force status is our object of study. We utilize the information in the current
employment and working history, for example, whether the individual works for pay, and
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information on primary and second jobs. Working hours are the sum of hours on primary jobs
and second jobs. We use date information to generate non-survey year working status and use
working hours to correct self-report errors. We do not distinguish between full-time jobs and
part-time jobs. However, if information on working hours and working weeks is missing, we use
1000 annual working hours for the part-time job and 2000 for the full-time job. Unemployment
is treated as non-work8. For a non-survey year, if respondents are working or not working in two
successive waves, respondents will be in the same labor status in the non-survey year and
working hours are equal to the previous wave's working hours. If respondents stop working, the
date information from the job history is used to fill the labor status in the non-survey year.
Similarly, the date of a job start is used when the status transitions from non-worker to worker.
For other variables in the non-survey year, some imputation rules are followed. Assets
contain most of the components in the Rand HRS except home equity. For the non-survey year,
assets are assumed to be equal to the previous year. Overall, changes in asset levels are smooth.
Housing wealth changes are obtained from the FHFA Repeat Sales Index. The respondents who
do not take the interview at wave 4 are dropped. All dollars measurements are deflated to the
year 2000 level by the Consumer Price Index.
We use pension wealth from Gustman and Steinmeier's contributions: Updated Pension
Wealth Data Files in the HRS Panel: 1992 to 2010, Part III. Self-reported pension wealth is the
sum of defined benefits from current job, last job, previous job, and defined contribution. The
wave 4 provides the initial pension wealth. We use the method of pension profile estimation
from French and Jones (2011) to control the private pension effects.

8

A different profile is generated with the self-report retirement.
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Some information on initial conditions at wave 4 is missing. Not all respondents report
their earnings history and pension wealth. We use Little's (1988) method to approximate
Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME, used to calculate Social Security benefits) and
pension wealth at wave 4. Table 7 presents a data description of initial conditions. Average selfreported private pension wealth is between average housing and non-housing wealth. The mean
difference across insurance types is extremely large. Health status is much worse for respondents
who do not have insurance. Hourly wages, housing wealth, non-housing wealth and AIME is
highest among the job-tied insurance group. Nearly half of job-tied insurance respondents prefer
to work after age 62 and 65, while this number is about 38 percent for other insurance
respondents.
[Insert Table 7 here]

Wages
Wage depends on age, health status and innovations. Its transition function is given by:
Wt 1  exp( w( Age, Healtht )   t 1 )

(17)

where Wt 1 is the hourly wage rate at next period, w is the log of hourly wage at current period,

 t 1 is a transitory shock following a first-order auto-regressive normal distribution.
Endogenous wage selection exists between full-time and part-time jobs. Fringe benefits
may make the hourly wage for full-time workers lower than for part-time workers because parttime workers usually do not have benefits such as health insurance. However, full-time jobs may
require more skills than part-time jobs. Firms may be reluctant to improve the skills of part-time
workers and hire part-time workers to do simpler jobs. We use the French and Jones (2011)
wage-generating function:
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Table 7:
Initial Conditions

Variable
Age
Birth Year
Health
Participation
Non-housing wealth
Housing wealth
Medcost
Pension wealth
Hourly wage
AIME
Initial Preference
# of observations

All
Mean
54.96
1943
0.2270
0.8213
163600
105100
1491
134200
18.61
28180
0.4202
1097

None
Mean
55.04
1942
0.4537
0.8287
95250
63610
1650
33780
13.07
17060
0.3789
227

Retiree
Mean
54.96
1943
0.1830
0.8093
170600
111500
1416
175800
18.75
30620
0.3849
530

Tied
Mean
54.91
1943
0.1441
0.8190
198300
122600
1501
136400
22.08
31790
0.5029
340

Table 8:
Parameter Values of Wage and Medical Cost Innovations
Variables
Value

𝜌𝑤
0.977

𝜎𝑤
0.12

𝜌𝑚𝑐
0.925

𝜎𝑚𝑐
2.278
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ln Wt   *ln Hourst  f ( Age, Healtht )  i   t

(18)

where  is the inverse labor supply elasticity, t is an individual fix effect and  t is an AR(1)
error term. We use the inverse labor supply elasticity value from Aaronson and French (2004):

  0.412 , which implies "work more and earn more." By using (ln Wt   *ln Hourst ) , wage
profiles are not different between full-time and part-time jobs. The first two columns of Table 8
are the calibrations of wage innovations from French (2005)9. Time correlation is a nearly unit
root process, which is not surprising because the uncertainty of wage for elderly is quite low
when approaching the end of their working career.
[Insert Table 8 here]
Retirement is not a one-time decision. The dynamic pattern of job transitions can still
cause real wage changes. In the forward-looking model, if working agents know that they will
face a decrease in wages or have difficulty finding a job after retiring, they may postpone their
retirement. On the other hand, social pensions and private pensions may trigger an incentive to
stop working. Computational resources do not allow inclusion of those situations in our model. A
study by van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008) using low-income households that includes the
effects of job tenure on the wage does these situations into account.

Medical Costs and Insurance Types
Medical costs are the sum of the various medical expenditures in the Rand HRS and the
insurance premia in the core file. In our model they depend on four control variables: age, health,
labor force status and insurance type. Except for updating the estimation of dynamic medical

9

Altonji, Smith, and Vadingos (2013) systematically studies the trends of earnings, employment, job changes, wage rates, and
work hours over a career. However, I do not include education, occupation and aggregation shocks on wage. Stratifying the
samples could mitigate the bias but limit the sample size.
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costs with our data, we again follow the method of French and Jones (2011). Following French
and Jones (2011), there are three insurance types in our model: no insurance, job-tied insurance,
and retiree-coverage insurance.10 Insurance type is not chosen directly. When an agent leaves the
labor force, his insurance type becomes no insurance. Moreover, only job-tied agents can
experience an insurance transition in our model; in other words, the no-insurance type is an
absorbing state, as is the retiree-coverage insurance type.
[Insert Figure 6 here]
Figure 6 shows the exit rate by insurance type for ages 59 to age 68. The first peak occurs
at age 62 for all insurance types. Unlike in previous studies, retiree-coverage insurance has the
second transition peak at normal retirement age. Agents of the no-insurance type are more likely
to retire at Medicare age 65. The likelihood is lower than the corresponding likelihood at early
retirement age. There is no peak at either age for job-tied insurance. However, as expected, the
exit rate from job-tied insurance increases monotonically with age. Insurance-type exit rates
contribute to the moment conditions.
Medical costs follow a first-order moving-average (MA(1)) process, the variance and
mean for which are calibrated using French and Jones (2011)11. Estimation across the twelve
combinations (four control variables times three insurance types) are performed using data from
waves 4 through 12 of the HRS using MSM. 30 moments and 30 quantiles are matched.

10

Current insurance type is determined by respondent answers to the following questions: 1) whether respondent has employerprovided insurance; 2) if yes, whether this insurance covers retirement. Additional information can be used to determine whether
there is retiree-coverage insurance. Veteran benefits and a combination of employer-provided plus spousal insurance are assumed
to imply retiree-coverage insurance. The retiree-coverage state is assumed to be absorbing because employers may be reluctant to
hire retirees who ask for insurance benefits.
11

The last two columns of Table 8 gives the value of the time correlation and variance of medical cost generating process.
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Figure 6:
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Housing
Housing wealth plays the most important role in our study. For a study that forecasts
local housing price changes based on a vector-autoregressive model, which takes into account
local drivers such as population growth, unemployment rate and average income, see Follain and
Giertz (2016). To minimize the number of state variables in the dynamic programming model,
we assume a national housing market. The housing-wealth generating process is given by:
H t 1  (1  gt )*(1   )*exp(ht   t )

(19)

where ht is the log of housing wealth, g t is the housing price growth rate,  is the depreciation
rate, and  t is the i.i.d. innovation to housing wealth. The growth rate, g t , is taken from the
FHFA national housing price index for the years 2003 through 2014. For years beyond 2014, g t
is set to 0.03. Respondents experience the housing boom and bust at different ages. To save
computational resources in the calculation, we assume all agents were born in the year 1943,
which is the average birth year in our sample.

Social Security Benefits and AIME
Social Security benefits calculation depends on the primary insurance amount (PIA),
which is in turn determined by the average indexed monthly earnings (AIME). The AIME is the
average of the 35 years of highest earnings deflated by the national wage index. It is updated
each year that the earned wage is higher than the lowest previous one. It is not feasible to
consider the employment history of each respondent. Instead, the AIME is imputed using a
regression to obtain the ratio,  t , of the lowest wage to the AIME between the ages of 55 and
70. The national wage growth rate is used to calibrate AIME growth before the age of 60, which
is the last age indexed the national wage index. The structural model uses annual wages instead
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of earnings. Hence, the ratio of lowest wage to AIME is predicted using the method of French
and Jones (2011). Thus, the following calculation is used in the model:

AIMEt 1  (1   * I (t  60) * AIMEt 
1
* max 0, Wt   t *(1   * I (t  60)) * AIMEt 
35

(20)

where  is the average wage growth rate, 0.016, from 2000 Green Book.

Pension Benefits
We assume that all pension plans in the model are defined benefits plans, even though
defined contribution plans have become more common recently. A defined contribution plan is
riskier than a defined benefits plan. The elderlies also are likely to have experienced a large loss
in their defined contribution balance during the Great Recession, which would provide another
incentive for the elderly to delay retirement. The determinants of pension benefits in our model
are age and the PIA. Hence, working one more year increases not only Social Security benefits,
but also pension benefits in our model.
The pension updating model is given by:
PWt 1 

1
* 1  r  * PWt  Pacct  pst 
1  st 1 

(21)

where PWt is pension wealth, st is the probability of living one more year, r is the rate of
return, Pacct is the pension accrual amount from working one more year, and pst is the level of
collected pension benefits. The initial value of PW is taken from the data provided by Gustman
and Steinmeier (2014), while the pension accrual rate profile that provides values of Pacct and
the coefficients necessary to compute the values of pst are taken from French and Jones (2011).
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Even though we have the values of pst , adding these values as a new state variable is
computationally prohibitive, so we use the PIA, which is already a state variable to impute the
values of pst when we estimate the structural model.

Spousal Income
Spousal income is a linear function of the first four powers of the male's age, health
status, and interaction of the powers of his age with his health status. Spousal income is the sum
of earnings, Social Security benefits, and pension benefits. We assume that the spouse will not
die before the husband.
[Insert Figure 7 here]
Spousal income profile estimations use the entire sample in the HRS. For single males,
spousal income is zero. The curvature of spousal income presented in Figure 7 seems reasonable.
The spousal income curve for a healthy husband is higher than the curve for an unhealthy one.
After the peak at the male age of 58, both curves decline.

Health Transition and Mortality
The estimation of health status transition uses a logit model, with the first three powers of
the male's age, and interaction of the powers of his age with his lagged health status. Because
HRS is a biannual survey, the lagged health status is from two years before. We assume the same
health transition Markov matrix in the non-survey year as in the survey year. In Figure 8, the
probabilities of bad health increase monotonically with age. Bad-to-bad health probabilities are
time-persistent. The mortality estimation uses the same functional form and explanatory
variables as the health transition estimation. The results presented in Figure 9 indicate the
mortality of unhealthy males is higher than that of healthy ones.
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Figure 7:
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[Insert Figures 8 and 9 here]

Types of Heterogeneity
The heterogeneity definition of French and Jones (2011) is only available for the first
wave in the HRS. Our initial wave is the fourth wave. We experiment with three definitions of
heterogeneity: prefer to save, strong bequest motive, and more likely to work after age 62 and
age 65. The first definition has a low response rate and the second turns out to be uninformative.
The third definition uses survey questions of "Probability of working after age 62" and
"Probability of working after age 65". The two types are defined by the sum of the two
probabilities, greater than one (Type 1 heterogeneity) and less than or equal to one (Type 2
heterogeneity). We use the first value that appears in the HRS as our definition of heterogeneity
types. Hence, the structural model has two sets of consumption weights and discount rates.

Re-Entry Status
The purpose of the re-entry status is to account for the fact that retirees are less likely to
re-enter the labor force when they get older and unhealthier. If we do not use re-entry status,
retirees are more likely to seek jobs when the earnings test is eliminated after normal retirement
age. In this case, the model shows an incorrect trend for labor participation at age 66. The
estimation generating re-entry status is similar to the mortality estimation. Figure 10 presents the
estimated unconditional (not restricted to currently being retired) re-entry rate by health status
for the entire sample. It declines across age and unhealthy retirees are less likely to re-enter.
[Insert Figure 10 here]

Moment Conditions and Numerical Methods
The estimation method is minimum distance estimation. The objective is to find the
preference vector minimizing the following function:
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Figure 8:
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Figure 9:
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Figure 10:
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arg min


I
i (, 0 )'W i (, 0 )
1

(22)

where I is the number of individuals in the sample,  is the ratio of simulated to observed
samples,  is the distance between simulated and observed moments, and W is weighting
matrix.  0 is the set of beliefs, discussed in the section immediately above. We use the variancecovariance matrix of the observed data as the weighting matrix. The weighting matrix does not
change within the estimation Moments are from ages 58 to 69. The moment conditions are:
•

First and second asset terciles by age to capture the saving behavior and

the effect of housing wealth on the consumption.
•

Labor-force participation hazard moments by age and insurance type to

capture the effect of Social Security and Medicare on the labor-force participation
decision.
•

Labor-force participation rates conditional on asset terciles and insurance

•

Labor-force participation rates conditional on heterogeneity type.

•

Log of working hours and labor-force participation rates conditional on

type.

health status.
In total, there are 240-moment conditions that need to be matched. Because of the
existence of working decisions and government transfers, the Euler equation for consumption
has multiple interior solutions. Solving and coding the Euler equations is extremely complicated.
Instead of computing solutions to these equations, we use grid search (policy function iteration)
to approximate the optimal solutions for consumption, working hours, and Social Security
application. Coarse discretization may induce computational errors and enlarge estimation bias.
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In the model, we assume that all individuals must apply for Social Security by age 70 and to
retire after age 7212.
We discretize continuous state variables: wage innovation, housing innovation, AIME,
housing wealth, and non-housing wealth. We use five-point Gauss-Hermite quadrature for wage
and housing innovations, ten-point AIME, and five-point housing, and ten-point non-housing
wealth. We do not discretize uniformly. We use more points for the lower levels of the housing
and non-housing wealth distributions to control for wealth concentration. Because of the fixed
cost of work and the re-entry cost, the valuation function is not globally concave. Besides the
larger grids for consumption, we also use nearest-neighbor search to look for the optimal
consumption decision. We recognize that grid selection and fineness of discretization may affect
the final results significantly. We use Tauchen's (1986) method to generate the Markov transition
matrix for wage and medical cost innovation.
Backward induction is used to solve the optimal decision at each age. Then, I use
interpolation and extrapolation to impute the decisions of simulated households from the initial
age to the final age. With the solutions of non-housing wealth and labor-force status, we can
construct the simulated moments and evaluate the criterion function of MSM.
As Victor Aguirregabiria (2011) says, substantial computing burden is due to repeat
solving dynamic programming whenever parameters change. Even though we use OpenMP
parallelization, each iteration takes about two and a half hours. An approximation method for
dynamic programming is not possible because there is no consumption information in the HRS.

12

Postponing the mandatory retirement age helps smooth the labor-force participation trend between ages 59 and 69, but
significantly increases computation time.
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Another curse of dimensionality comes from the parameters set. We have 14 parameters to
estimate, which increases the convergence time. Therefore, we use the simplex method.

Estimation Results and Model Fitness
Table 9 presents the estimation results for the original model. Consumption weights are
similar across heterogeneity types. Agents unlikely to work past ages 62 and 65 have a
significantly lower discount rate than their counterparts. This is consistent with the hypothesis
that agents who initially say they will not work in the future may in fact prefer to do so. The
estimate of the bequest curvature indicates bequest is a luxury good. The fixed costs of bad
health and working are positive, which is consistent with our expectations. The consumption
floor is nearly 4600 dollars. Because of the large number of moments, the over-identification test
is rejected in all estimations. However, the simulated decision profiles are close to the observed
counterparts. We discuss some of the differences between simulated and observed decisions.
[Insert Table 9 here]
Figure 11 shows the differences for non-housing wealth quantiles. French and Jones
(2011) combine housing and non-housing wealth in total assets and find saving occurs in
wealthier households. After separating housing and non-housing wealth, agents in the higher
quantiles for non-housing wealth reduce saving from the age of 60 to 65. During the calendar
period of our sample, housing wealth is booming, and consumption tends to increase. It is not
surprising to find the decline for non-housing wealth in the model. When the housing market
enters the bust period, agents switch to a saving mode. However, the match quality of the nonhousing wealth quantile moments is weak. There are two potential reasons for this. First, many
households in the higher quantiles of non-housing wealth also have a significant amount of
housing wealth. The wealth effect of housing price increases contributes to a dramatically
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Table 9:
Original Model Results
Variables
Discount rate (type 0)
Discount rate (type 1)
Consumption weight (type 0)
Consumption weight (type 1)
Risk aversion
Leisure endowment (*1000)
Bequest Curvature (*100000)
Propensity of bequest (%)
Fix cost of bad health (*100)
Fix cost of working (*100)
Age effects of working (*10)
Fix cost of reentry (*100)
Consumption floor (*1000)
Housing proportion rate
Over-identification test=
Degrees of Freedom
P value

Estimates
0.6715
0.9986
0.5272
0.5788
2.655
4.636
4.634
10.64
4.462
1.747
0.808
1.563
3.284
0.252
3732
206
<0.001

Std.Err
0.0096
0.0066
0.0065
0.0064
0.0534
0.4707
0.0478
0.7929
0.1877
0.0635
0.0533
0.2077
0.0710
0.0106
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increased level of consumption, resulting in further declines of non-housing wealth. The second
reason is the collateral constraint and debt. If households are extremely risk-averse, they avoid
borrowing against housing wealth. The modified model does better in fitting saving behavior.
[Insert Figure 11 here]
Figures 12 and 13 show both the unconditional labor-force participation rate and the rate
conditional on health status. The rates decrease with age in both graphs. The largest
improvement because of the addition of re-entry status in our model is the absence of an upward
movement of the labor-force participation rate at the normal retirement age. However, the hazard
rate is underestimated at the early retirement age, which leads to the higher exit rates after
normal retirement age in Figure 8. This is possibly because of the approximation of the AIME
and coarse discretization of non-housing wealth. (There are only 10 discretizations.) We cannot
identify whether it reflects the liquidity constraint is binding for most of the households. The
liquidity constraint is key to increasing the exit rate at early retirement age. The approximate
mean level of the AIME used in our model is 20 percent lower for those respondents for which
the actual level is known in the restricted data. On the other hand, the modeling of the re-entry
status may be too simple. If agents expect they will not re-enter the labor market after retirement,
they are reluctant to retire earlier. Figure 14 is the labor-force participation profile from the
modified model. Although the bias is smaller, our estimates still slightly overestimate between
the ages of 62 and 65 and slightly underestimate after age 65.
[Insert Figures 12, 13 and 14 here]
Figures 15 shows the labor-force exit rates. The simulated exit rate at the early retirement
age is about seven percent, which is only half of the sample mean. Figures 16, 17, and 18 show
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Figure 11: Non-housing Wealth Quantiles, Data versus Simulations
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Figure 12: Labor Conditional on Health, Data versus Simulations
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Figure 13: Labor, Data versus Simulations
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Figure 14: Labor, Data versus Simulations, extension
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the labor-force participation rates across different insurance types. The model underestimates the
labor-force participation rate at younger ages for the no-insurance group. There is overestimation
for the retiree-coverage insurance group. The simulated curve rotates to the right around age 64.
To examine the reasons, I would have to use se the AIME from the restricted data on the highperformance computer, which is not possible. The level of saving during the bust is smaller than
the use of non-housing wealth during the boom in the original but not in the modified model.
After obtaining government transfers payments, agents are locked into social welfare programs.
When the proportion of "free ride" agents increases, savings behavior becomes weaker.
[Insert Figures 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 here]
Table 10 presents the estimation results from the modified model with the collateral
constraint. There are three important differences between the original and modified models.
First, the risk- aversion coefficient nearly doubles from 2.6 in the original model to 5.3 in the
modified model, so that the results for saving behavior improve (see Figure 19) The reason the
simulated second tercile for non-housing wealth becomes flat is perhaps a result of the high exit
rate at age 65 with subsequent loss of wages. Second, the bequest motive propensity change. In
the modified model, households are more inclined to leave a bequest. Third, the consumption
floor nearly doubles in the modified model.
[Insert Table 10 here]

Robustness Check
Table 11 presents the estimates without housing wealth. The coefficients do not change
when we use non-housing wealth moments in our model fitness criteria, compared to when we
use total wealth. There are four differences compared to the original model. First, the discount
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Figure 15: Job Exit, Data versus Simulations
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Figure 16: Labor of None, Data versus Simulations
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Figure 17: Labor of Retiree, Data versus Simulations
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Figure 18: Labor of Tied, Data versus Simulations
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Figure 19: Non-housing Wealth Quantiles, Data versus Simulations, Modified
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Table 10:
Modified Model Results
Variables
Discount rate (type 0)
Discount rate (type 1)
Consumption weight (type 0)
Consumption weight (type 1)
Risk aversion
Leisure endowment (*1000)
Bequest Curvature (*100000)
Propensity of bequest (%)
Fix cost of bad health (*100)
Fix cost of working (*100)
Age effects of working (*10)
Fix cost of reentry (*100)
Consumption floor (*1000)
Housing proportion rate
Over-identification test=
Degrees of Freedom
P value

Estimates
1.0699
0.9100
0.5439
0.6892
5.3710
3.8391
4.2322
5.0479
4.8031
1.6459
0.8604
1.6524
6.2219
0
1625.6
207
<0.001

Std.Err
0.0119
0.0129
0.0121
0.0131
0.1627
0.0816
0.3180
0.2064
0.4043
0.1318
0.1055
0.5641
0.2134
****
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rates for Type 1 heterogeneity and Type 2 heterogeneity switch. Type 2 agents become more
patient than Type 1 agents. The original model results indicate that Type 1 agents are patient and
work in order to save. On the contrary, now in the robustness check, Type 1 agents are impatient
and work in order to consume. Second, the risk-aversion coefficient increases to nearly 5.
Housing is an insurance mechanism. If there were no precautionary saving through housing
wealth accumulation, the elderly would be more risk averse. Third, the bequest motive curvature
increases by nearly $110,000. By coincidence, the gap is the mean of housing wealth. Excluding
housing wealth makes the bequest motive more of a luxury good. Fourth, the estimate of the
consumption floor in the robustness check is approximately $5,000, which is similar to that of
French and Jones (2011). The saving behavior for the higher tercile appears in Figure 20.
[Insert Table 11 and Figure 20 here]
Table 12 presents the estimates from a specification without housing wealth and
heterogeneity types. The estimation excludes housing wealth from the asset accumulation
function and uses the total wealth moments, in order to compare the results to those of French
and Jones (2011). The bequest motive is strong as well. Risk aversion increases and the bequest
propensity decreases. In our second robustness check, the bequest motive is even stronger than in
the results of the original model and the robustness check with heterogeneity. The leisure
endowment and all time costs decrease, and the consumption weight is higher than in the other
two results.
[Insert Table 12 here]
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Table 11:
Robustness Check, Without Housing Wealth
Variables
Discount rate (type 0)
Discount rate (type 1)
Consumption weight (type 0)
Consumption weight (type 1)
Risk aversion
Leisure endowment (*1000)
Bequest Curvature (*100000)
Propensity of bequest (%)
Fix cost of bad health (*100)
Fix cost of working (*100)
Age effects of working (*10)
Fix cost of reentry (*100)
Consumption floor (*1000)
Housing proportion rate
Over-identification test=
Degrees of Freedom
P value

Estimates
1.012
0.5376
0.4623
0.5581
4.964
4.581
5.766
13.20
7.086
1.220
0.4583
2.368
4.911
0
2580
207
<0.001

Std.Err
0.0097
0.0153
0.0076
0.0073
0.1351
0.0642
0.5706
1.1570
0.2846
0.0311
0.0390
0.1675
0.0648
****
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Figure 20: Non-housing Wealth Quantiles, Data versus Simulations, Robust
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Table 12:
Robustness Check, Without Housing Wealth and Heterogeneity
Variables
Discount rate
Consumption weight
Risk aversion
Leisure endowment (*1000)
Bequest Curvature (*100000)
Propensity of bequest (%)
Fix cost of bad health (*100)
Fix cost of working (*100)
Age effects of working (*10)
Fix cost of reentry (*100)
Consumption floor (*1000)
Housing proportion rate
Over-identification test=
Degrees of Freedom
P value

Estimates
0.843
0.592
7.943
3.497
5.536
2.074
5.189
2.642
1.133
0.888
4.551
0
2003
187
<0.001

Std.Err
0.0123
0.0069
0.2118
0.0555
0.2299
0.0524
0.1764
0.1037
0.0814
0.1137
0.1061
****
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Counterfactual Experiments
The counterfactual experiments examine different housing price expectations and tighter
borrowing constraints. The first counterfactual experiment examines what happens when the
return on housing wealth is fixed at its long-run level of 3 percent annually. Note that both
original and modified models use the actual HPI. The second experiment examines what happens
in the absence of a housing bust. We use the long-run housing growth rate after the year 2008
(average age of 66). The third experiment examines the effect of a tighter borrowing constraint
from home equity. The new equity line is 50 percent of home value, which represents a decrease
from the 75 percent level in the modified model.
[Insert Figures 21, 22 and 23 here]
Because the modified model results best match the actual saving behavior, the
counterfactual experiments are based on the estimation results from Table 10. Figures 21 through
23 show the observed working profile, the simulated working profile from the original model
and the simulated working profile from the modified model across the non-housing wealth
terciles. The original model uses housing wealth change as a potential financial resource and
does not allow the households to borrow. Hence, households with limited non-housing wealth
who expect a decline in housing wealth may return to the labor market. The reason that the
original model shows that the households with higher levels of non-housing wealth re-enter the
labor market at age 62 maybe because of the underestimation of the labor-force participation rate
before this age. In the modified model, we fit declining rates of labor-force participation well,
except for households with low levels of non-housing wealth. In the observed data, there is no
large decrease in labor-force participation rates either at Medicare age and normal retirement
age. Perhaps, this is because of the substantial loss of housing wealth for wealthy households
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Figure 21: Labor Participation Rate, Data, Non-housing Wealth Quantile
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Figure 22: Labor Participation Rate, Original Model, Non-housing Wealth Quantile
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Figure 23: Labor Participation Rate, Modified Model, Non-housing Wealth Quantile
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after the housing bust and the limited borrowing ability of poorer households. Moreover, the
declining labor-force participation rate reverses at age 67 among households in the second tercile
for non-housing wealth. Our original and modified models cannot capture this phenomenon.
[Insert Table 13 and Figure 24 here]
Table 13 presents the summary from the simulations. There is only a 1 percent change in
the average labor-force participation rate in experiment 1. It is reasonable that the average HPI
from the year 2000 to 2014 is three percent, which is close to the long-run growth rate. However,
Figure 24 shows that the retirement profile is quite different in the low asset quantile. When the
housing price return is high, the working rate is nearly ten percent lower in the modified model
than in experiment 1 at age 59. When the housing bust begins, the declining trend of labor
participation is much flatter in experiment 1 than in the modified model after the age of 64. The
two different assumptions on HPI expectation do not lead to large differences for wealthy
households.
[Insert Figure 25 here]
In experiment 2, if households do not expect a housing bust, the average labor-force
participation rate is 5 percent lower than the estimation results. The largest effects are for
households with the lower two terciles of non-housing wealth. In Figure 25, their labor-force
participation profiles can be seen to shift downward. It reconfirms that housing price declines
mainly affect households at the borrowing margin.
[Insert Figure 26 here]
There is a 2 percent increase of the labor-force participation rate in experiment 3, where
we decrease the level of the home-equity line. The tighter borrowing limit acts similarly to a
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Table 13:
Labor-force Participation Profiles: Modified Model and Experiments
Age
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
Avg.

Modified
0.7126
0.6924
0.6614
0.6209
0.5808
0.5366
0.4489
0.3925
0.3511
0.3156
0.2805
0.5084

Experiment 1
0.7360
0.7066
0.6634
0.6086
0.5509
0.4941
0.4004
0.3554
0.3240
0.2988
0.2764
0.4922

Experiment 2
0.6598
0.6335
0.5926
0.5494
0.5097
0.4699
0.3841
0.3429
0.3137
0.2910
0.2704
0.4561

Experiment 3
0.7119
0.6958
0.6661
0.6283
0.5927
0.5522
0.4690
0.4151
0.3741
0.3371
0.2961
0.5217
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Figure 24: Labor Participation Rate, Experiment 1, Non-housing Wealth Quantile
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Figure 25: Labor Participation Rate, Experiment 2, Non-housing Wealth Quantile
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Figure 26: Labor Participation Rate, Experiment 3, Non-housing Wealth Quantile
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decrease in housing wealth. The increase in the overall labor-force participation rate stems from
increased participation rates for males in the lower two terciles of non-housing wealth. In Figure
21, the labor-force participation trends for males in these quartiles become flatter, while rates for
males in the top tercile remain nearly unchanged.

Discussion and Conclusion
Several recent studies have examined durable and non-durable consumption in the
context of a life-cycle model. Aaronson, Agarwal and French (2012) conclude that housing
wealth changes affect the debt levels of poorer households. This is consistent with the finding in
this paper that the non-housing wealth accumulation profile is significantly different when
housing is included as an illiquid asset. During housing boom-bust periods, most loans are
originated to extract cash, by refinancing an existing mortgage loan into a larger mortgage loan
(Demyanyk and Van Hemert 2011). Extracted cash can finance consumption or invest in the
financial market (Cocco 2004). Most of the studies do not focus on the elderly (Aaronson,
Agarwal, and French 2012, Cocco 2004, and Yang 2009). The role of the effect of home equity
on elderly labor-force participation needs further investigation.
Both original and modified models fit labor-force participation well and the modified
model fits non-housing wealth accumulation closely. Including housing wealth in the model
significantly affects the savings behavior of wealthy households. The change of housing wealth
affect labor-force attachment through the different channels, specifically, consumption, the
bequest motive, and precautionary savings. if the elderly expect the decline in housing wealth,
they may postpone retirement to secure their future living standards in the face of possible
adverse outcomes. In the original model, consumption Increases due to increases in housing
wealth induces declines in non-housing wealth accumulation for males in their early 60's, and
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social welfare programs disincentivize saving in poorer households. Therefore, declines in nonhousing wealth accumulation lead to smaller bequests in the original model. In the modified
model, concerns regarding debt increaser saving and the bequest motive becomes stronger.
We introduce a new state variable, potential re-entry status that blocks a large re-entry
rate at the normal retirement age due to the elimination of the Social Security earnings at that
age. The probability of re-entry decreases with age and unhealthy males are unlikely to re-enter
the labor market. The coefficient of housing wealth in the original model is estimated to be close
to the ratio of mortgage to home value in the sample. This suggests that an equity line of credit
collateralized by housing wealth is one of the leading factors affecting consumption and saving.
Our experiments examine how results would change when 1) households expect HPI to
increase at its long-run value of 3 percent, 2) there is no housing-bust episode and 3) there is a
tight borrowing constraint. In the first experiment, the labor-force participation choices of
households change significantly across non-housing wealth terciles, even though the change in
average labor-force participation is small. In the second experiment, where there is no housing
bust, the average of labor-force participation rate decreases by almost 5 percent and households
at the borrowing margin are strongly affected compared to the modified model. In the third
experiment, the effect of a tighter borrowing constraint will increase the average labor-force
participation rate by 2 percent. In summary, the three experiments suggest that decreasing
housing wealth and tighter borrowing constraints will delay retirement, particularly for
households with little liquid assets.
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